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L Introduction
"I'm sorry, your card has been declined." These words may trigger a
range of emotions from mild embarrassment to frightened panic. They may
also inform veterans' widows, disability benefits recipients, and retirees that
their bank accounts-accounts often holding their only means of subsistenceare frozen.' Encouraged by the government to have their benefits checks
directly deposited into bank accounts, 2 and under the (legally valid) impression
that private creditors do not have the right to seize their benefit money, 3 these
vulnerable citizens nonetheless cannot access their funds. How did this

happen?

1. See Frozen Out: A Review of Bank Treatment of Social Security Benefits: Hearing
Before the S. Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter Taliaferro, Frozen Out],
available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/O92007testwt.pdf
(statement of Waverly Taliaferro, Social Security beneficiary, New York, New York, 3)
(describing two freezes of his bank accounts containing Social Security retirement benefits);
Rob Johnson & Ray Reed, Observers Debate Banks' Obligationsin Garnishments,ROANOKE
TIMES, Nov. 6,2006 at Al (describing freezing of a disability beneficiary's account); Ellen E.
Schultz, The Debt Collector vs. The Widow, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28,2007, at Al (telling the story
of a veteran's widow who had her benefits frozen).
2. See Soc. Sec. Admin., Social Security Online: Direct Deposit, http://www.
ssa.gov/deposit (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (extolling the virtues of direct deposit: "No more
waiting in line. It's safe, quick and convenient.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Press Release, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, VA Begins Direct Deposit Program for
Insurance Payments (Aug. 6, 1998), available at http://wwwl.va.gov/opa/pressrel/
pressrelease.cfin?id=97 ("'Veterans and beneficiaries won't have to worry if their check is lost
in the mail or stolen,' said VA Under Secretary for Benefits Joe Thompson. 'Electronic fund
transfer will give them the peace of mind of knowing their payments are guaranteed to be on
time, every time."'); Electronic Transfer Account (ETA)-Direct Deposit/EFT [Electronic
Funds Transfer] Facts, http://www.eta-find.gov/DirectDepositFacts.cfm (last visited Oct. 14,
2008) (listing convenience, reliability, security, and flexibility as positive attributes of direct
deposit) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000) (protecting Social Security Benefits); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(d)(1) (2000) (protecting Supplemental Security Income Benefits); 38 U.S.C.
§ 5301(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005) (protecting Veterans' Benefits); 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (2006)
(protecting Federal Civil Service Retirement Benefits); 45 U.S.C. § 23 lm (2000 & LEXIS 2009
current through Pub. L. No. 110-460) (protecting Federal Railroad Retirement Benefits). But
see infra note 44 (discussing exceptions that allow garnishment of funds otherwise exempted
under 42 U.S.C. § 407 to collect certain domestic support and governmental obligations).
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When the accountholder contacts the bank, she will discover that a
creditor has filed a garnishment order against her account, which the bank has
frozen. To remedy the situation, she must go to court for a hearing. Weeks
will pass before she can access her funds, and even after the law has exonerated
her-by determining that the creditor never had a right to the funds in the first
place-the bank will charge her a substantial fee for the "service" of garnishing
her account, as well as fees for any checks written and returned during the
freeze.4 She will likely request to receive all future benefits checks through the
mail, subjecting her to check-cashing fees, the danger of carrying cash, and
delays in payment receipt-the problems that direct deposit was designed to
avoid.
To be sure, in most cases the benefit recipient voluntarily incurred the debt
that ultimately led to the garnishment order and subsequent account freeze. Be
that as it may, federal law prioritizes ben'eficiaries' claims to their funds over
the judgments of standard creditors. 5 Thug, the scenario described above defies
congressional intent. Freezing accounts based on garnishment orders directed
toward exempt funds finds no support in policy considerations. Bank fees
made pursuant to the freeze also run contrary to the public interest. As a
consumer advocacy group recently noted:

"It makes no sense

. . .

for the

American taxpayer to be expending millions of dollars on a yearly basis to help
recipients avoid destitution, only for substantial portions of6these funds to be
siphoned off by the banks that are distributing their funds.",
Congressional intent to preserve beneficiaries' rights and access to
subsistence funds currently lies tangled in a web of widely diverging state laws
and bank policies. This Note calls for disentanglement-ideally through
detailed, comprehensive legislation. This legislation should facilitate automation
4. See Frozen Out: A Review of Bank Treatmentof Social Security Benefits: Hearing
before the S. Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Saunders, Frozen Out], availableat
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/092007testms.pdf (statement of

Margot Saunders, Counsel, National Consumer Law Center, 4, 9) (describing the process for a
beneficiary to prove exemption; listing standard bank fees). According to a recent Social
Security Administration (SSA) Report, America's twelve largest financial institutions collected
$994,143 in fees for garnishing accounts containing electronically deposited Social Security
benefits. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUBL'N No. A-15-08-28031,
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE REPORT:
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DEDUCTING FEES AND
GARNISHMENTS FROM SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFrS 10 (2008) [hereinafter SSA REPORT],

available at http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-15-08-28031.pdf. This figure excludes
(because of the institution's lack of data) four of the twelve largest financial institutions, and
also excludes all smaller institutions. Id. app. C at C-3. Thus, the total dollar amount of
garnishments by all financial institutions is likely much higher.
5. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing federal exemption statutes).
6. Saunders, Frozen Out, supra note 4, at 7.
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of exempt fund identification, ensure recognition of priority creditors,' require
banks to assert exemptions on behalf of debtors, prescribe a uniform accounting
method, and provide an enforcement mechanism. While legislation effectuating
these elements would have placed an onerous burden before the information age,
banking technology makes compliance significantly easier today.8 Practical
problems are surmountable; Congress needs only the political will to act.
Structurally, this Note first illustrates, in Part II, the process through which
"exempt funds" 9 in bank accounts are frozen by the banks and potentially paid to
the creditor if the beneficiary' fails to act in time or effectively. Part HI then
describes and evaluates federal and state statutes bearing upon exempt fund
garnishment, surveying the laws of all states and focusing on the specific
procedures in Virginia. Part IV examines Due Process and Supremacy Clause
challenges to state garnishment statutes that provide inadequate beneficiary
protection, contending that all state laws violate both clauses to varying degrees.
Moving from the process and law as they currently exist to the process and law as
they should be, Part V identifies public and private action that would remedy or
alleviate the problems of freezing and garnishing exempt funds. Part VI assesses
the approaches suggested in Part V, finding private action inadequate, finding
promise in federal regulatory and state legislative action, and recommending
congressional legislation as the optimal method of beneficiary protection.
Ultimately this Note concludes that a federal flat exemption, of the type currently
required under California and Connecticut law," would provide an effective
interim solution.i 2 The best long-term solution would require banks to assert
actual exemption amounts on behalf of beneficiaries.

7. See infra note 44 and accompanying text (allowing garnishment of otherwise exempt
funds to pay certain domestic relations and governmental obligations).
8. See Saunders, FrozenOut, supra note 4, at 5 ("The [banking information] technology
is simple-every electronic deposit is denominated by the source and type of funds.").
9. This phrase appears throughout the document in reference to the list of statutes supra
note 3, subject to the qualifications listed infra note 44 and exceptions to those qualifications
described infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
10. This Note uses the words "beneficiary," "debtor," and "depositor" interchangeably.
Although these words have obviously distinct meanings, the legal issues in this Note refer only
to beneficiaries who are both debtors and depositors, so all three terms above will apply to a
person described as any of them.
11. See infra notes 37, 87 (describing California and Connecticut requirements that banks
make a certain portion of any account containing electronically deposited exempt funds
available to the depositor).
12. See infra Part V.A. 1 (proposing this interim solution as part of a broader legislative
package).
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I. Overview of The Exempt Funds GarnishmentProcess
The path from benefits receipt to attempted recovery of funds and fees takes
many twists and turns. While most of the legal issues addressed in this Note arise
towards the end of the process, an understanding of the steps leading to the
garnishment order and account freeze clarifies the problems facing creditors,
debtors, and banks. Thus, this Part examines the process from soup to nuts,
illustrating each step of the typical exempt fund garnishment scenario--beginning
13
with benefits determination and ending with post-garnishment claims in court.
Upon award of a federal benefit, such as Social Security or Veterans'
benefits, the determining agency instructs the recipient to designate a bank
account for receipt of funds by direct deposit or, if necessary, to open an
account. 14 Although the recipient may choose to opt out and receive benefits

13. This Note addresses only situations in which the bank and creditor are separate
entities. For a discussion of whether banks may deduct fees for loans they make to customers
from these customers' bank accounts containing exempt funds, see Loren Prizant, Note, Offsets
Or Upsets? An Examination of the Role of 42 U.S.C. § 407 in Relation to a Bank's Setoff of
Social Security Benefits, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 169, 171 (2003) (contending that bank setoff of
funds does not constitute the "legal process" required under 42 U.S.C. § 407).
14. See 31 C.F.R. § 208.3 (2008) (providing that all federal disbursements must be
electronically deposited unless recipient obtains a waiver under 31 C.F.R. 208.4); id.
§ 208.7(b)
(directing benefit-granting agencies to develop procedures facilitating direct deposit). The
Department of the Treasury reportedly intends to alter existing regulations to require electronic
deposit for all beneficiaries with bank accounts. Letter from Margot Saunders, Counsel,
National Consumer Law Center, at 9 n.25 (Nov. 27, 2007), in response to Proposed Guidance
on Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28, 2007)
[hereinafter Saunders, Response to Proposed Guidance], available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2007/November/20071129/OP- 1294/OP- 1294_7l.pdf. Many
banks offer programs, called Electronic Transfer Accounts (ETAs), specifically for federal
benefits depositors. See 31 C.F.R. § 208.5 (2008) ("Any Federally-insured financial institution
shall be eligible, but not required, to offer ETAs as Treasury's Financial Agent."); see also ETA
Homepage, http://www.eta-find.gov (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (allowing beneficiaries to search
for the closest available participating financial institution) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). Banks have reported, however, that benefits-only accounts are not popular with
customers. See Letter from Andrea Beggs, Senior Vice President, JPMorgan Chase & Co., at 8
(Nov. 27, 2007), in response to Proposed Guidance on Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit
Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Beggs, Response to Proposed
Guidance], availableat http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2007/November/20071129/OP1294/OP-1294_14_l.pdf ("Consumers clearly prefer the convenience and flexibility of an
account that allows all types of deposits."); Letter from Kathleen Kloiber Koch, Assoc. Gen.
Counsel, Bank of America, at 8 (Nov. 27, 2007), in response to Proposed Guidance on
Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28, 2007)
[hereinafter Koch, Response to Proposed Guidance], available at http://www.
federaleserve.gov/SECRS/2007/December/20071204/OP-1294/OP-1294 211 .pdf("The ETA
account could not accept non-benefit deposits and was not widely accepted by consumers.").
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checks by mail, most recipients do not.'5 After this initial deposit, the agency
electronically deposits benefits monthly unless the recipient opts out of direct
deposit.
The next event in the sequence involves an extension of credit to the benefits
recipient. This credit extension arises in a number of ways. For example, the
beneficiary may accept an unsolicited credit card offer through the mail, take out
16
a line of store credit, or receive hospital services effectively rendered on credit.
The beneficiary then defaults on the debt. When late payments add up, the
creditor undertakes debt collection efforts. Such efforts may17include late payment
notifications, warnings, and referral to a collection agency.
When hope of collection without legal action has failed, the creditor sues
and obtains judgment against the debtor in state court, often by default
judgment. 18 The creditor gives the debtor notice of the suit, usually through a
template form. 19 If payment from the debtor is not immediately forthcoming, the
creditor may seek a garnishment order.2 °
15. See Schultz, supra note 1 (showing a steady increase in the percentage-currently
over 80%---of Social Security checks deposited directly into bank accounts).
16. See Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 480 F.3d 470,472 (7th Cir.
2007) ("Ella Beler bought products from JCPenney using a house-label credit card."); Schultz,
supra note 1 (noting that an unpaid hospital bill led to a court judgment and subsequent
garnishment of exempt funds); Henry L. Woodward, Commentary, Now Where, Exactly, was
that Safety Net for a Vet's Widow?, ROANOKE TIMES, June 23, 2002, at Horizon 3 (telling the
story of a benefits recipient who had her bank account garnished based on debt from an
unsolicited credit card offer received through the mail). This Note does not examine mortgage
and automobile financing, as the creditor's security interest in the house or automobile typically
precludes the need to garnish a bank account to recover the debt.
17. See ACA International, Collections Information, http://www.acainternational.org/
KnowledgeBase/default.aspx?cid=5431 (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (collecting statistics on
collection agencies, which currently number 6,500 in the United States) (on file with the
Washington and Lee University Law Review).
18. No data are available regarding the frequency of default judgments, which are very
difficult to reverse. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428(A) (2007) (requiring a plaintiff
wishing to set aside a default judgment to prove: (1) fraud; (2) a void judgment; (3) proof of
settlement; or (4) that defendant was in active military service at the time of the judgment);
Charles v. Precision Tune, Inc., 414 S.E.2d 831, 833 (Va. 1992) (holding that a court may not
set aside a default judgment unless defendant meets the proof required by § 8.01-428). As these
debtors usually have no grounds to contest a creditor's claim, default judgments likely constitute
a high percentage of judgments in the consumer credit context.
19. Debtors sometimes complain that these forms provide inadequate notice. See, e.g.,
Beler, 480 F.3d at 473 (discussing plaintiff's assertion that, due to unclear language in letters
from the creditor, she could not identify which creditor had initially sued and obtained default
judgment against her). The paucity of published case law in this area probably derives from the
high prevalence of default judgments; the debtor often has few or no grounds for contestation.
See supra note 18 (discussing default judgments).
20. For an example of state-specific garnishment procedures, see infra Part III.B.2
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Withjudgment in hand, the creditor locates funds to garnish. Once funds
are found, the creditor serves a copy of the garnishment summons on the bank
holding the funds and notifies the judgment debtor.21 The creditor has no legal
responsibility to verify whether an account may contain exempt funds before
proceeding with a garnishment order.2 2 The garnishment order commands the
bank to file an answer, hand over the funds immediately, or withhold funds
until a court establishes the validity of the garnishment.23 As it happens,
creditors "often blanket all banks within a given area in an attempt to locate
assets of a debtor;" thus, there is a good chance that the bank will not have any
of the debtor's accounts.24
When the bank receives the garnishment order, it freezes the beneficiary's
account. 25 The freeze takes effect immediately upon request, and the
beneficiary may not withdraw any funds until the bank lifts the freeze, possibly
even if the garnishment order requests less than the amount of funds remaining
in the account.26 The bank typically charges fees to the beneficiary both for the

(detailing Virginia's garnishment procedures).
21. See, e.g., Garnishment Summons, Va. Form DC-451 (2007), available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/forms/district/dc45 l.pdf (providing detailed instructions to the
bank receiving the garnishment order); Request for Hearing-Garnishment Exemption Claim,
Va. Form DC-454 (2007), availableat http://www.courts.state.va.us/forms/district/dc454.pdf
(notifying judgment debtor of exemptions from garnishment, including Social Security and
Veterans' benefits). This form is not, of course, designed to provide the debtor with advance
notice of the garnishment; this would cause shrewd debtors to withdraw all funds immediately.
22. While most state laws do not include an affirmative requirement that the creditor
determine such funds are not exempt, some state laws do impose this duty on the creditor. See,
e.g., OHio REv. CODE AN. § 2716.11 (West 2006) (requiring a creditor to sign an affidavit
asserting a "reasonable basis to believe" that the garnishee has nonexempt property); Lee v.
Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, 484 F. Supp. 2d 816, 820 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (finding a
creditor's "subjective belief' that a garnishee might have nonexempt property insufficient to
comport with Ohio law). Alaska and Arizona have similar code provisions. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.38.080(b) (2006) (requiring the creditor to affirm a "reason to believe" that the garnishee
has nonexempt property); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1572(2) (2003) (requiring "good reason
to believe" that a garnishee has nonexempt property). Still, the success of such a measure
depends on a debtor's willingness and ability to assert her rights following the garnishment.
23. See, e.g., Garnishment Summons, Va. Form DC-451 (2007), available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/forms/district/dc45 1.pdf("You are hereby commanded to (1) file a
written answer with this court, or (2) deliver payment to this court, or (3) appear before this
court on the hearing date and time shown on this summons .... ).
24. SSA REPORT, supra note 4, app. F at F-2. Although beyond the scope of this Note,
this creditor practice appears to be a further waste of banks' time and resources.
25. See Saunders, Frozen Out, supra note 4, at 3-4 (describing a standard bank response
to garnishment orders, which is to freeze the account as instructed on the garnishment order).
26. See Schultz, supra note 1 (noting that a garnishment order for $125 resulted in
freezing the beneficiary debtor's account containing $679).
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freeze ($100-$150) and for each automated or check transaction ($25-$35) she
makes while her funds are unavailable due to the account freeze.2 7
When the beneficiary realizes that the funds in her account have
disappeared, her first likely reaction is to contact the bank. The bank then
informs the beneficiary that a creditor has claimed the funds via garnishment
order and that the funds will not be available until a court determines the
exempt status of the funds.28 A few banks will immediately recognize the
exempt status of the funds and release the freeze on the account.29
After the bank freezes the account, the beneficiary receives the
garnishment notice from the creditor. 30 This notice includes a form to request a
hearing for claiming exemptions. 3' The beneficiary attends the hearing,
bringing benefits documentation-as instructed by the notice-to demonstrate
the exemption.32 The court then issues the garnishment disposition, notifying
the creditor that funds cannot be garnished and prompting the bank to lift the
account freeze. 33 This entire process may take weeks, even months. 34 Even
when the sequence is complete, the creditor may later issue another

27. See Saunders, Frozen Out, supra note 4, at 7 (describing typical bank fees).
28. Although in many states creditors are required to provide notice of the garnishment to
the debtor, see, e.g., supranote 21 and accompanying text, this notice often does not reach the
debtor before the funds are frozen, and even if it does, few consumer debtors are likely to
understand its practical implications, see Saunders, Frozen Out, supra note 4, at 4 ("[M]ost
banks ignore even clear evidence of exempt funds-such as electronic deposit from the Social
Security Administration-and simply freeze the recipient's bank account.").
29. Many such banks, if exempt funds are identifiable, would not have frozen the account
in the first place. See Henry Woodward, Editorial, Keeping ProtectedIncome Safe, ROANOKE
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at B9 (noting that benefits recipients "may be able to switch to a credit
union or locally owned bank that will do the 'right thing,"' asserting in the garnishment answer
that the account contains no garnishable funds); see also Saunders, Frozen Out,supranote 4, at
15 n.33 (providing a list of banks with stated policies not to honor garnishment orders if an
account contains only exempt funds).
30. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-5 11 (2007) (requiring the judgment creditor to mail a copy
of the garnishment order to the debtor after service on the bank).
31. See id. § 8.01-5 12.4 (requiring the judgment creditor to provide the judgment debtor
with notice of possible exemptions, including a list ofn"major exemptions under federal and state
law").
32. See id. (requiring notice that instructs judgment debtors to bring documentation
proving exemptions to the hearing).
33. See, e.g., Garnishment Disposition, Va. Form DC-453 (2006) (allowing the creditor to
release the garnishment for reasons specified on a list that does not include exempt status ofthe
garnished funds) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
34. See Taliaferro, Frozen Out, supra note 1, at 2 (describing twenty-three days without
access to funds); Schultz, supra note 1 (describing a three-month delay for a beneficiary in
Minnesota).
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garnishment order on the same account, freezing the funds again and forcing
the beneficiary to assert her exemption once more.35
Accounts that commingle exempt funds with nonexempt funds present a
challenge for depositors and banks alike in determining exemption.36 Under
current law in most states, the burden falls on the debtor to demonstrate that
funds in the account are exempt.37 One deposit containing a small sum of
nonexempt funds can "contaminate" the beneficiary's account, throwing into
question the exempt status of all funds.38
To this point, this sequence description presumes that the beneficiary
knows her benefits are exempt and asserts that exemption. Some beneficiaries,
however, may not know that their benefits are exempt, and thus may never
challenge the garnishment order. 39 Because most beneficiaries depend on their
benefits for subsistence, beneficiaries will likely take every action within their
power to gain access to the funds. Given the vulnerability of the beneficiary
population, however, some are powerless to take action, and creditors receive
the benefit money despite the federal protections. A recent Social Security
Administration report estimates that in fiscal year 2007, $177.7 million was
transferred to creditors through garnishment procedures from bank accounts
35. See Frozen Out: A Review of Bank Treatment of Social Security Benefits: Hearing
Before the S. Finance Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Williams, Frozen Out],
available at http://www. senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/092007testjw.pdf
(statement of Julie L. Williams, Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 5)
(describing recurring garnishment orders that repeatedly freeze exempt funds).
36. Compare Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Bankers Association in Support of
Defendant-Appellee HSBC Bank USA at 21, Huggins v. Pataki, No. 02-7950 (2d Cir. 2003),
availableat 2003 WL 23475663 ("There is no single method by which presumptively-exempt
funds could be segregated and, in any event, it would be unreasonably complex for banks to
implement such a procedure on a broad scale."), with Saunders, Frozen Out, supra note 4, at 5
("The use of a simple accounting system-as has been required by the courts as a matter of
routine when there is commingling--could be easily adapted for automatic use by banks .... ").
37. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.080(f) (2006). For an exception to prevailing state
laws, see CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 704.080(b) (West Supp. 2008) (exempting statutorily defined
amounts-ranging from $1,225 to $3,650 depending upon the number of depositors and type of
benefits-from garnishment without a debtor claim).
38. See Taliaferro, Frozen Out, supra note 1, at 2-3 (describing how a bank's
promotional gift for opening an account rendered the funds commingled, making the account
freezable and undermining the bank's promise not to freeze accounts containing only Social
Security funds).
39. This problem is particularly likely to arise in states that do not require that the court or
creditor provide notice to the debtor of the garnishment. See infra Part III.B, notes 97-98 and
accompanying text (describing states that do not provide for notice to the debtor); see also
Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (considering argument
that debtors may "presume that once a judgment has been entered, there is nothing they can do
to prevent collection of the debt from whatever funds they may possess").
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containing directly deposited Social Security benefits. 40 No data are available
on the amount or incidence of account freezes, which present a more common
problem.
If the beneficiary's challenge to the garnishment does not succeed, or if
the beneficiary wishes to recover bank fees, she may file suit on statutory or
constitutional claims. 4' At this point, however, the beneficiary has already
suffered considerable harm; she has been cut off from her benefits,
often
42
subsist.
to
simply
measures
humiliating
and
desperate
to
resorting
II. StatutoryLaw
In the model federalist arrangement, state and federal statutory law
dovetail neatly, each with its own well-defined sphere of sovereignty. In
practice, however, the two spheres of legislation often overlap-forcing courts
to choose which law to apply-or under-lap-leaving gaps that courts and
private actors must fill. The relationship of federal beneficiary protection law
to state garnishment law provides a scenario that can be viewed either way-that neither state nor federal law covers the situation, or that the two sets of
laws conflict directly. Subpart A identifies the relevant federal laws and their
often complex interplay. Subpart B assesses pertinent state statutes, noting the
gaps left between these statutory schemes and the commands of federal law that
allow account freezes and garnishment of exempt funds to occur.
A. FederalLaw
Several federal statutes bear upon exempt fund garnishment; this subpart
discusses them in rough order of importance to the issue. The exemption
statutes themselves provide the analytical foundation.4 3 Other statutes qualify
these exemptions, allowing garnishment for certain limited purposes.44 Still
40. SSA REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
41. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (describing claims brought under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)); infra Part IV (describing constitutional challenges to
state garnishment procedures).
42. See, e.g., Taliaferro, Frozen Out, supra note 1,at 2 (describing his twenty-three days
without access to his benefits: "We ate all our staples, spent the silver dollars I'd saved as keepsakes, and then survived off a ten pound bag of brown rice.").
43. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (listing the exemption statutes).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) (2000) (allowing garnishment of funds otherwise exempted
under 42 U.S.C. § 407 to collect child support and alimony payments); 26 U.S.C. § 6334(c)
(2000) (allowing garnishment of benefits to collect unpaid federal taxes); 26 U.S.C. § 6331 (h)
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other statutes and regulations interact with these qualifications, limiting the
amount of exempt funds that may be garnished to a specified percentage of the
benefit. 45 The Federal Financial Management Act of 1994 (FFMA) 46 and the
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (DCIA) 47 require electronic deposit
of federal benefits and enable federal agencies to deduct certain debts from
exempt federal benefits.48 Finally, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA), 49 although it does not affect exemptions directly, may serve as a
basis for challenging garnishment tactics by debt collectors. Although this
collection of statutes does not provide an exhaustive list of federal laws
affecting exempt fund garnishment, 50 it does define the primary framework for
considering the pertinent legal issues.
Title II, Section 208 of the Social Security Act of 193551 provides the most
broadly applicable exemption. It exempts Social Security benefits from all
legal process, including garnishment. Subsection (a), the operative provision,
reads as follows:
The right of any person to any future payment under this title shall not be
transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid
or payable or rights existing under this title shall be subject to execution,

(2000) (authorizing the Internal Revenue Service to collect overdue federal tax debts of
beneficiaries by levying up to 15% of each monthly payment until the debt is paid); 26 U.S.C.
§ 3402(p) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (allowing beneficiaries to elect to have a percentage of
benefits withheld and paid to the Internal Revenue Service to satisfy federal income tax
liability); 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(A) (2000) (rendering benefits subject to administrative offset
to another federal agency for nontax debts).
45. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006) (limiting garnishment to 25% of disposable
earnings unless an exception applies); 20 C.F.R. § 350.4(a) (2008) (limiting garnishment of
Railroad Retirement benefits for support obligations to 65%).
46. Federal Financial Management Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-356, § 401, 110 Stat.
3410, 3412 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.) (establishing various rules
regarding agency finances, including a requirement to electronically deposit federal benefits).
47. Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 31001, 110 Stat.
1321, 1321-358 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.) (addressing collection
of debts owed to the federal government).
48. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of these two
Acts).
49. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109,91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2006)) (restricting collection mechanisms available to creditors).
50. For an example of a federal statute tangentially affecting exempt fund garnishment,
see 12 U.S.C. § 91 (2006) (prohibiting pre-judgment or mesne attachment of funds held by a
national bank).
51. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, Pub. L. 74-271 § 208, 49 Stat. 620, 625 (enacting
exemption language now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000)).
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levy, attachment, garnishment, or other
legal process, or to the operation of
52
any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
The statute provides broad protection from any practice rendering benefits
"subject" to "legal process."53 Its purpose, plainly enough, is protection of
beneficiaries and their dependents from claims of creditors. 4 Other statutes
exempt other federal benefits (including Veterans', Federal Civil Service
Retirement, and Federal Railroad Retirement Benefits) from most claims of
garnishment .
Several statutes qualify 42 U.S.C. § 407.56 One major qualification,
enacted in 1975, allows garnishment of benefits to pay child support and
alimony.17 As one court stated, "The purpose of exemptions is to relieve the
person exempted from the pressure of claims hostile not only to his own
essential needs but also to those of his dependents. 5 8 Public policy does not
view family support as an interest hostile to the beneficiary, nor does it view the
need for familial support payments as any less important than the beneficiary's
need. In some instances, such support payment might represent the family
member's only source of income. Thus, Congress allows garnishment of
benefits for familial support.
Other qualifications enable the federal government to collect its debts.
One code section enables the Internal Revenue Service to garnish exempt funds
to collect back taxes, 9 and another allows beneficiaries to voluntarily withhold

52. Id.
53. While the U.S. Code does not define "legal process," the U.S. Supreme Court recently
defined legal process as process "requir[ing] utilization of some judicial or quasi-judicial
mechanism... by which control over property passes from one person to another in order to
discharge or secure discharge of an allegedly existing or anticipated liability." Wash. State
Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003).
For an argument that freezing a bank account pursuant to a garnishment order constitutes an
action subjecting benefits to legal process, see infra Part IV.B.
54. See, e.g., French v. Dir., Mich. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 285 N.W.2d 427, 431 n.4 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1979) ("[T]he purpose of § 407 of the Social Security Act is to protect the benefits
recipient and those dependent on him from claims of creditors." (citing Brown v. Brown, 288
N.E.2d. 852, 853 (Ohio App. 1972))).
55. Supra note 3. In this Note, for purposes of simplicity and clarity, 42 U.S.C. § 407
serves as the primary reference point for discussions of exempt federal benefits.
56. See supra note 44 (defining debts, such as child support and alimony, for which
Social Security Disability benefits lose their exempt status).
57. See Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. § 459,93-647,88 Stat. 2337,
2357-58 (1975) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 659 to allow legal process upon federal benefits to
recover child support and alimony payments).
58. Thiel v. Thiel, 197 A.2d 354, 357 (N.J. 1964) (emphasis added).
59. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331(h), 6334(c) (2000).
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a portion of benefits to cover future tax liability. 6 0 A third provision61 allows
administrative offset of nontax debts owed to other federal agencies.
These qualifications, however, may themselves be qualified.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, for instance, are not subject to
garnishment for any reason, including child support and alimony.62 This
variance presents challenges to familial support creditors, government agencies,
garnishees, and debtors alike. Administrative offsets are also subject to
limitations-9,000 per year in benefits remain exempt from administrative
offset. 63 Because this offset typically occurs pre-deposit, this qualification does
not present a major issue. Potential domestic relations and government
garnishment of post-deposit benefits funds could, however, be subject to this
qualification. 64 Another qualification comes from the Consumer Credit
Protection Act (CCPA),6 5 which limits the amount of income that a creditor
may garnish to between fifty and sixty-five percent depending on the
obligation.66
In assessing the interrelation of the various exemption statutes, statutes
excepting certain preferred creditors from the exemption, and statutes limiting
the extent of the preferred creditors' exceptions, potential practical problems
abound. For example, consider the scenario of a domestic support creditor
seeking to garnish exempt funds. Several steps must occur in identifying the
proper amount of exemption. First, the general exemption from legal process
60. 26 U.S.C. § 3402(p) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
61. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(A) (2000).
62. Although no statute explicitly codifies this ban on garnishing SSI funds, courts and
agencies recognize it. See, e.g., Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 20 S.W.3d 273,
276 (Ark. 2000) (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 659 qualifications apply only to money paid in
remuneration for past employment, making these qualifications inapplicable to SSI benefits);
Metz v. Metz, 101 P.3d 779, 782-83 (Nev. 2004) (contrasting SSI, a "federal social welfare
program" contingent upon means testing and not prior work-related income, with Social

Security Disability (SSD) benefits, available contingent upon prior work income regardless of
the beneficiary's means); see also E-mail from Soc. Sec. Admin. to Allen Myers (Dec. 17,2007,

08:38 EST) ("Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments are not the same as Social Security
benefits. SSI payments are not subject to levy or garnishment.") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
63. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2000).
64. See SSA REORT, supranote 4, app. Cat C-3 (showing that the nation's twelve largest

financial institutions processed over $9 million in garnishments for preferred creditors).
65. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321,82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006)) (establishing safeguards for consumer debtors).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2006) (limiting the percentage of earnings that may be
garnished); see also 20 C.F.R. § 350.4(a) (2008) (limiting child support and alimony

garnishment to 65% of a Railroad Retirement recipient's benefit). The word "earnings" is
defined to include pension and retirement program income. 15 U.S.C. § 1672 (2000).
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must be identified. Second, the creditor must assert the domestic support
qualification. Third, the debtor must assert the CCPA garnishment limitation.
While the math does not present overwhelming challenges, the process of
manually identifying and asserting these exemptions requires knowledge and
vigilance. 67 In practice, few garnishment orders may present this sort of
complexity. Banks, beneficiaries, and creditors, however, must deal with these
exemption issues when they arise.
Two acts of Congress set the problem of exempt fund garnishment into
full swing. The FFMA initiated the move towards electronic funds transfer,
stating that all federal benefit payments would henceforth be made by direct
deposit. 68 The DCIA required that "all federal payments made after January 1,
1999, shall be made by electronic funds transfer. 69 As a result, more federal
benefits money sits in banking accounts, far more vulnerable to garnishment
than its exempt legal status would suggest.
Legislative intent behind the DCIA is somewhat opaque. First, Congress
passed the Act as part of an omnibus appropriations bill, hardly an ideal subject
for divination.7 °
Second, the Act's stated purposes included both
"maximiz[ing] collections of delinquent debts owed the government" 71 and
"ensur[ing] that debtors have all appropriate due process rights., 72 The Act
also provided for the administrative offset of federal funds referenced above.73
While these statutes demonstrated no specific intent to weaken the exempt
status of federal benefits in relation to private creditors, that has been the
statutes' effect.
Finally, the FDCPA may come into play in garnishment litigation. Some
beneficiaries have succeeded with claims that a debt collector's failure to
67. The potential complexity of this manual process makes garnishment exemption
assessment a prime candidate for automation, as discussed infra Parts V.A.2 and V.B.
68. Federal Financial Management Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-356, § 402, 108 Stat.
3410,3412 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3332 (2000)) (requiring electronic payment of
federal benefits).
69. Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134 § 31001(x)(l)(A),
110 Stat. 1321, 1321-376 (1996) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3332(f)(1) (2000)); see
also 31 C.F.R. §§ 208.1-208.11 (2008) (setting forth regulations effectuating electronic benefits
disbursement).
70. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321, 1321-358 (introducing the DCIA on the 358th page of the appropriations bill).
71. Id. § 31001(b), 10 Stat. at 1321-358 (listing the maximization ofcollection ofdebts
owed to the government as the legislation's first stated purpose). Nothing in the statutory
language suggests any intent to facilitate debt collection for private creditors.
72. Id.§ 31001(b), 110 Stat. at 1321-359(listingdebtordueprocessprotectionasthefifth
stated purpose).
73. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing various offsets).
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investigate whether or not funds in a bank account were exempt before seeking
garnishment violates the FDCPA.74 This remedy, however, requires a state law
placing the burden on debt collectors to check bank accounts before garnishing
them."
What emerges from the federal statutory picture is a web of laws working,
to some extent, at cross-purposes with one another. While the exemption
statutes assert the strongest influence and serve as the basis for all of the other
laws, statutes that qualify these exemptions make clear that the exemptions are
not absolute. While the FDCPA seeks to protect consumers from unscrupulous
predatory collection, the DCIA specifically seeks to facilitate debt collection.76
Although none of these laws directly conflict with one another, some of these
statutes have inadvertently eroded the foundational federal benefits protection
laws. The laws that have most severely eroded benefits protection, however,
come from state legislatures.
B. State Law
State law controls the procedural mechanics of garnishment, including
protection of benefits therefrom. Because garnishment is a creature of statute,
"in derogation of the common law, 7 7 and because federal law does little to
circumscribe garnishment processes, state statutory schemes serve a vitally
important role in protecting benefits from garnishment. Nonetheless, the vast
majority of state garnishment regimes leave beneficiary debtors subject to
account freezes, and some statutory structures do not even require notice to
the debtor.
Section 1 of this subpart surveys the law in all fifty states. Rather than
addressing each state's laws individually in cumbersome detail, this subpart
groups states into three classes according to the level of protection the state
provides to beneficiaries: (1) states providing extraordinary protection;
74. See Hogue v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1051 (S.D. Iowa
2007) (holding that plaintiff stated an FDCPA claim based on creditor's failure to investigate);
Jordan v. Thomas & Thomas, No. C-1-04-296, 2007 WL 2838474, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26,
2007) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's FDCPA claim).
75. See Hogue, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 (noting that Iowa law does not disallow judgment
creditors from discovering details about a debtor's assets); Jordan,2007 WL 2838474 at *4
(stating the Ohio requirement that a judgment creditor have a reasonable basis to believe that the
funds sought to be garnished are not exempt).
76. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting collections-oriented purpose).
77. Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. S. & W. Constr. Co. of Tenn., 475 So. 2d 145, 147
(Miss. 1985); see also Freeport Motor Cas. Co. v. Madden, 188 N.E. 415, 417 (Ill. 1933)
("Garnishment is a statutory proceeding unknown to the common law.").
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(2) states providing notice; and (3) states providing nothing.78 This subpart
then notes other garnishee rights and obligations under state law that affect
exempt fund garnishment and identifies state law trends over the past thirty
years. Following this overview of all states, section 2 of this subpart focuses
on the post-judgment garnishment process in Virginia. The Virginia
discussion includes a substantial shift in state law stemming from a 1983
case, and an example of a minor change to the state's standard garnishment
form that produces a major impact on banks and beneficiary debtors.
1. Overview of the Fifty States (and the District of Columbia)
All states have laws providing for garnishment of bank accountswhether referred to as trustee process,79 restraining notice, 0 or
garnishment8' -

to

execute judgments against debtors. The methods (or lack

thereof) by which the states protect exempt funds from garnishment,
however, vary widely. Congress noted "great disparities among the laws of
the several States relating to garnishment" in 1968,82 and the laws appear just
as disparate today. 3 Nevertheless, one can identify common characteristics in
garnishment law among certain groupings of states. Using a survey of state
garnishment law conducted in 1980, 84 and comparing state law then to state law
today, this Note identifies three main classes of state statutory schemes.
The first class, which numbers only four states, provides extraordinary
protection to accounts containing exempt funds. The second and largest class,
which includes forty states, requires notice to the debtor of the garnishment,
and often of the right to exemptions and a hearing. The third class, containing

78. See infra Appendix: State Law Survey for an overview of each state's garnishment
procedure; the appendix groups states by class.
79. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2601-3105 (2003 & Supp. 2007) (setting
forth Maine's trustee process); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 246 §§ 1-83 (West 2004)
(describing trustee process in Massachusetts).
80. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5222 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2008) (referring to garnishment
notice to the garnishee and debtor as "restraining notice").
81. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-511 to -525 (2007) (describing Virginia's
garnishment process).
82. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 301(a)(3), 82 Stat.
146, 163 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(3) (2006)).
83. See SSA REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 ("From our review, we determined the laws of the
States [relating to garnishment and account freezes] were not uniform.").
84. See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 86-93 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., dissenting)
(surveying garnishment law in the District of Columbia and forty-nine states).
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seven states and the District of Columbia, provides no clear procedure (and
sometimes no procedure at all) 85 for notifying the debtor of garnishment.
California, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania all provide
extraordinary protection to beneficiary debtors. California, Connecticut, and
New York each require a bank, if an account contains reasonably identifiable
exempt funds, to exempt a certain dollar amount from garnishment. In
California, this amount depends on the type of benefits received and the
number of accountholders.8 6 In Connecticut, a flat $1,000 exemption applies to
all accounts containing identifiable exempt funds deposited within the thirty
days prior to the garnishment order.87 New York recently enacted a law
exempting $2,500 from accounts containing readily identifiable electronically
deposited exempt benefits. 88
Pennsylvania provides an even more
extraordinary protection; any account in which an agency regularly deposits
exempt funds electronically-even an account containing both exempt and
nonexempt funds-is completely immune from garnishment.8 9 Pennsylvania's
statutory scheme also protects banks from good faith errors made when
asserting exemptions in their responses to garnishment orders. 90 While the
Pennsylvania statutory scheme may raise issues of what happens when a bank
fails, in good faith, to identify exempt funds, it relieves banks from the threat of
liability for claiming exemptions on behalf of debtors.
Most states fall into the second class. This class of states provides for
garnishment notice to debtors, but places the burden upon debtors to assert the
exemption. Intricacies of notice requirements vary widely amongst these states.
Some states define a detailed garnishment form that includes a list of the most
85. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-39-350 to -490 (2005) (setting forth a garnishment
scheme without requiring notice to the judgment debtor). Such a scheme may not survive a due
process challenge. See infra note 98 (describing similar state statutes overruled on due process
grounds).
86. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 7.04.080(b) (West Supp. 2008) (defining account
exemption amounts-from $1,225 to $3,650-based on the number of depositors and type of
benefits).
87. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-367b(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (exempting the
lesser of the account balance or $1,000 from garnishment if the account contains readily
identifiable exempt funds deposited within thirty days of the bank receiving the garnishment
order).
88. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(/) (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2009) (exempting $2,500 in any
account containing reasonably identifiable exempt benefits deposited within forty-five days of
the garnishment order). The law took effect on January 1, 2009.
89. See PA. R.C.P. No. 3111.1 (West Supp. 2008) (exempting all funds in an account in
which funds are deposited electronically on a regularly recurring basis).
90. See id. at No. 3146(b)(2) (immunizing garnishee from liability to creditor for funds
identified as exempt).
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common exemptions. 91 Others only inform the debtor that she may have the
right to assert exemptions.92 Still others do not address exemptions at all.93
The notice may provide a form for the debtor to request a hearing.94 It may
suggest the debtor take certain action to assert exemptions. 95 It may not
describe the process for asserting exemptions at all. 96
The third class of states provides no notice to debtors of the garnishment
or exemptions.9 7 Several courts in states with such laws have held that
garnishment of exempt benefit funds without notice to the debtor constitutes 9a8
deprivation without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While no case law suggests that these statutes would survive a due process
challenge today, such statutes remain on the books in six states and the District
of Columbia.
Although this Note categorizes the states based primarily on notice
provided to the debtor, some state laws impact the process in other ways. Some
statutes, for instance, speak to the rights and obligations of garnishee banks to
act on behalf of debtors. 99 Some states also provide for general monetary
91. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-512.4 (2007) (requiring notice to debtor of
exemptions with a form for claiming them and instructions for filing the claim and requesting a
hearing).
92. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-735(a)(2) (2005) (defining Kansas notice procedure,
which informs debtor of right to assert exemptions, but does not require notice of what
exemptions might exist).
93. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-55-102 (2008) (stating that in Colorado, notice must
be served to debtor upon a property seizure writ, but not defining contents thereof).
94. See supra note 91 (identifying Virginia exemption and hearing request form
requirements).
95. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-404 (2000 & Supp. 2008) (directing the debtor to
go to the clerk's office and complete a form).
96. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-63 (West 2000) (identifying that notice to debtor is
required while mentioning nothing as to the content of the notice).
97. According to a letter from one bank, some state laws may actuallyprohibit notice to
the debtor. See Beggs, Response to Proposed Guidance, supra note 14, at 3 n. 1 ("Some seizure
warrants and forfeiture notices issued on behalf of federal or state authorities are filed under seal
and the financial institution is prohibited from notifying the accountholder of the seizure.").
98. See Davis v. Paschall, 640 F. Supp. 198,203 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (holding that Arkansas
statutes did not contain adequate procedural safeguards to protect debtor due process rights);
Dorwart v. Caraway, 966 P.2d 1121, 1146-47 (Mont. 1998) (holding that Montana law violates
due process by not providing notice of seizure, exemptions, and hearing procedure), overruled
on other grounds by Trs. of Ind. Univ. v. Buxbaum, 69 P.3d 663, 674 (Mont. 2003). In both
Arkansas and Montana, these decisions led to state legislation providing for notice to the debtor.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-110-402(l)(A) (2006) (requiring notice to debtor of garnishment and
hearing rights); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-211 (2007) (requiring notice to debtor of the
seizure, right to exemptions, and procedure for contesting the garnishment).
99. See 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-707 (West 2003) (setting forth duties of
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exemptions that appear to justify exempting funds from any source in a bank
account.1°° Some statutes shield banks from liability when acting in good faith
to assert an exemption,101 to freeze the account, 10 2 and in one state even for
delivering the funds to the creditor.'0 3 Three states require creditors to sign an
affidavit stating that they have a "reasonable basis to believe" that the garnishee
has nonexempt property of the debtor.""4
When mentioning state laws that impact exempt fund garnishment, no
discussion would be complete without mentioning garnishee liability. Virtually
every state has a statute holding a garnishee liable for ignoring or failing to
comply with a garnishment order.10 5 In such instances, the bank is personally
liable to the creditor for the amount of the debt. 10 6 Notable, however, is the
lack of a single reported case in which a bank was held liable for asserting that
funds were exempted by law from garnishment. 0 7 While banks (and the
garnishee to hold any "non-exempt" property, thereby implying a right to identify exemptions
and refuse to turn over exempt property); MD. RULE 2-645(e) (LexisNexis 2008) (allowing
garnishee to assert "any defense that the judgment debtor could assert").
100. See 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8123 (West 2007) (providing a general monetary exemption
of $300); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-8-1 (LexisNexis 2005) (including $1,000 on deposit as a
general exemption); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.18 (West 2007) (including $1,000 in a depository
account as a personal use exemption).
101. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-367b(o) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (providing
good faith immunity for banks making "bona fide error[s]" in attempting to prevent garnishment
of exempt funds).
102. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.73 (West 2000) (shielding gamishees from liability
for wrongful retention of funds if such retention is done in good faith).
103. See N.M. STAT. § 35-12-12 (1996) ("In any action by a defendant against a garnishee
based on any indebtedness of the garnishee or on possession of any personal property, it is a
conclusive defense for the garnishee to show that the... property [was] delivered under
judgment of the magistrate court in a garnishment proceeding.").
104. ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.080(b) (2006); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1572(2) (2003);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2716.11 (West 2006). Imposing the duty upon creditors to verify the
nonexempt status of funds in an account provides considerable beneficiary protection, exceeded
only by first-class state laws requiring banks to prevent freezes on certain levels of exempt
funds.
105. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 642.13 (West 1995) (holding garnishee liable if it has
money from debtor that it does not pay according to the garnishment order). As of November
2008, the author is unaware of any state that does not hold a garnishee liable for ignoringa
garnishment order, although this does not mean that assertingan exemption leads to liability.
Some states explicitly reject the notion of bank liability for asserting a debtor's exemptions.
See, e.g., PA. R.C.P. No. 3146(b)(2) (West Supp. 2008) (providing safe harbor for banks that
misidentify funds as exempt).
106. See Mazzuka v. Bank of N. Am., 280 N.Y.S.2d 495, 500-01 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967)
(holding a bank liable for negligently releasing funds to a debtor). No exemption was at issue in
Mazzuka.
107. See Saunders, Response to Proposed Guidance, supra note 14, at 16 ("[W]e have
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agencies that regulate them) often assert the threat of liability under state law as
a reason for freezing the account while a court considers the exemption, 0l 8 this
threat has never materialized. State garnishee liability laws, as applied to
exempt fund garnishment, stand as nothing more than paper tigers that banks
have no rational basis to fear (unless, of course, they ignore garnishment orders
altogether).
Overall, state law gives one great cause for concern, but also offers
glimmers of hope for beneficiary debtor protection. Several banks have
endorsed the statutory schemes in California and Connecticut as potential
models for nationwide legislation or regulation. 109 Additionally, twenty-five
states have enacted laws since 1980 improving debtor notice or protection."l 0
Yet in all states but four, banks find support in state statutes and rules for
freezing accounts containing exempt funds. And in every state but
Pennsylvania,' 1the debtor may be required to assert the burden of proving the
exemption before the bank will release all funds in the account. The demands
of this structure on the often indigent and almost always vulnerable population
of beneficiaries seem startlingly inconsistent with the broad statutory
protections that 42 U.S.C. § 407 affords federal benefits.

never heard of any case in which a bank suffered even the burden of legal inquiry after it refused
to honor an attachment or garnishment order because the only funds on deposit were exempt.").
108. For two examples of agencies asserting that this threat of liability justifies bank
freezes, see Frozen Out: A Review of Bank Treatment of Social Security Benefits. Hearing
before the S. Fin. Comm., 10th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Kelsey, Frozen Out],
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/O92007testsk.pdf (statement of
Sara Kelsey, General Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 11) (identifying bank
liability that could potentially follow from a bank failing to freeze a debtor's account) and
Williams, Frozen Out, supranote 35, at 2 ("Where financial institutions impose a freeze on an
account, as noted above, they are doing so pursuant to court orders or state law procedures.").
109. See Beggs, Response to Proposed Guidance, supranote 14, at 2 ("We believe that the
California and Connecticut garnishment laws provide good examples of a workable scheme for
automatic exemptions, and we would support federal regulations with a similar approach.");
Letter from James S. Keller, PNC Financial Services Group, at 4 (Nov. 27,2007), in response to
Proposed Guidance on Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273
(Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Keller, Response to Proposed Guidance], available at
http://www.federaleserve.gov/SECRS/2007/November/20071129/OP-1294/OP-1294_12_1.pdf
(recommending the California approach).
110. See infra Appendix: State Law Survey (identifying these states with an asterisk).
11. See PA. R.C.P. No. 3111.1 (West Supp. 2008) (banning banks from freezing any
account containing any exempt funds).
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2. Focus. Virginia
Virginia, sitting within the second class of states as defined above in
subpart III.B. 1, provides as good an example of a state statutory garnishment
scheme as any other. 112 Virginia has codified its garnishment procedure in VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-511 to -525 (2007). Harris v. Bailey, 13 a 1983 case
holding that the garnishment procedures in effect at the time violated the
debtor's due process rights, significantly shaped Virginia procedure. 1 4 The
Harriscourt chastised Virginia's statutory scheme for failing to provide notice
to beneficiary debtors at the time of garnishment and for allowing five months
to pass between the institution of garnishment proceedings and recovery of the
exempt funds. 115 Virginia statutes now
require notice to the debtor and a
6
prompt hearing to assert exemptions. "
To begin a post-judgment garnishment proceeding in Virginia, the creditor
first fills out a form suggesting to the court issuing the judgment that a certain
bank may have funds to pay the judgment." 7 The judgment creditor provides
contact information for the bank and the judgment debtor to the clerk of court,
8
who prepares a garnishment summons and mails it to both bank and debtor."
The creditor must also provide the total amount of the debt due and attempt in
good faith to provide the debtor's Social Security number.1 9 Virginia also

112.

For a general overview of exemptions and bank account garnishment in Virginia, see

DOUG RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND LIENS iN VIRGINIA §§ 3.6-3.8 (2d ed.

1994 & Supp. 2008). Professor Rendleman also collects and discusses recent developments in
exempt fund garnishment jurisprudence across the country, including issues of bank setoff
against exempt funds, attorney liability for misstatements relating to garnishment requests,
communications from debt collectors to debtors, and limitations on the amount of funds in an
account that may be frozen. Id. § 3.6(A) (Supp. 2008).
113. Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966, 970 (W.D. Va. 1983) (concluding that "the
Virginia post-judgment garnishment procedures demonstrate[] several deficiencies").
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-512.4 (2007) (requiring that creditor mail a prescribed
notice form to debtor listing exemptions and explaining how to assert them); id. § 8.01-512.5
(mandating a hearing within seven days of filing the exemption form).
117. Id. § 8.01-511 (stating that the clerk of the court will issue the garnishment summons
upon creditor's request and provision of information); id. § 8.01-512.3 (defining required
content of garnishment summons form).
118. See id. § 8.01-511 (identifying required information that a creditor must provide about
the debtor, debt, and garnishee).
119. See id. (stating requirement, and authorizing creditor to serve interrogatories upon
debtor for purposes of obtaining this information).
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requires that
the summons specify whether it seeks to garnish wages or
20
property.'
The bank receives a garnishment summons 121 and a garnishee answer
form. 22 Virginia gives the garnishee ninety days to answer a property
garnishment summons. 123 The garnishee summons provides detailed
instructions to the bank for filling out the garnishee answer form. 24 Between
2004 and 2006, this summons informed the garnishee that if the account
contained only federal benefits funds, such as Social Security payments, the
funds were exempt. 125 In 2006, responding to bank pressure, the Virginia
Supreme Court Rules Committee removed this exemption language from the
form.126 In 2006, before removal of this exemption language, a state trial judge
held a large bank in contempt for ignoring the summons' warning that federal
benefits were exempt from garnishment, awarding attorney's fees to the
beneficiary. 27 Today, the basis for that finding of liability no longer exists,
simply because one sentence was removed from the garnishment form.
While the bank fills out the garnishee answer form, the beneficiary debtor
(assuming she has the individual capacity or advice of competent counsel) fills
out the exemption form. Presumably, the debtor must request a hearing within

120. See id. (directing the creditor to select wage garnishment for notices sent to
employers, and property garnishment for notices sent to banks, such as those that end up
catching exempt federal benefits); id. § 8.01-512.3 (informing employer garnishees of statutory
limitations on the amount of wages that may be garnished, but providing no analogous
notification of exemptions for property garnishment).
121. See Garnishment Summons, Va. Form DC-451 (2007), http://www.courts.state.
va.us/forms/district/dc45 1.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (providing detailed instructions to the
bank receiving the garnishment order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
122. See Garnishee's Answer, Va. Form DC-456 (2006), http://www.courts.state.
va.us/forms/district/dc456.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (providing the form for answering a
garnishment request) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
123. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-514 (2007) (contrasting with 180 days to answer a wage
garnishment summons).
124. See supra note 122 (identifying the Garnishee's Answer form in Virginia).
125. See Katie Kuehner-Hebert, Who Determines Whether a Deposit Can Be Garnished?,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 15, 2006, at 7, 7 (describing banks' desire for relief from the burden of
identifying exempt funds).
126. See James W. Speer, Protecting Disability Benefits from Creditors, 41
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 382, 387 (2007) (describing the battle between legal aid attorneys and
large banking interests over the content of the garnishment summons form, and noting the
willingness of some small banks to refrain from freezing accounts automatically upon receiving
a garnishment summons).
127. Id. (noting that this case prompted banks to "flex their political muscle" to get the
garnishment form changed back to the pre-2004 version, which did not mention exemptions).
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the ninety days the bank has to answer, 128 although the notice form does not
give a timeline.129 The debtor mails or personally delivers this form to the court
issuing the garnishment order, and the statute promises a hearing within seven
days of filing the exemption claim. 130 If all goes as it should, the debtor brings
benefits documentation to the hearing, the judge recognizes the exemption, the
court issues the garnishment disposition form,' 3 ' and the bank releases the
funds; the process takes at least three weeks from freeze to recovery. Ifall does
not go as it should, the commingling of nonexempt funds with exempt funds
may present an obstacle to asserting the exemption, 132 or the debtor may not be
able to respond to the request for hearing-in which case the exemption, not
asserted, is lost.
The pitfalls of this scheme for elderly and disabled beneficiaries are easy
to identify. The federal law's guarantee of benefits protection gets lost in the
mundane details of statutes, court orders, and forms. Yet, as noted above,
many states have similar (and worse) schemes in place. If such schemes do not
directly violate the letter of federal exemption law, they certainly violate its
spirit.
IV. ConstitutionalChallenges to State GarnishmentStatutes
Beneficiary debtors aggrieved by state garnishment laws have taken their
grievances to court on two constitutional bases. First, the beneficiary may
argue that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the state procedure denied her
due process commensurate with the deprivation. 33 Second, she may contend
128. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-514 (2007) (noting that the bank has ninety days to
respond to a garnishment order).
129. See id § 8.01-512.4 (defining notice exemption form, but not defining the due date).
Presumably, the court assumes that the debtor will be motivated to act quickly by the need to
recover funds needed for subsistence.
130. See id. § 8.01-512.5 (noting the seven-day hearing requirement).
131. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (identifying the Virginia Garnishment
Disposition form).
132. See Bernardini v. Cent. Nat'l Bank of Richmond, 290 S.E.2d 863, 865 (Va. 1982)
(holding, in a setoff case, that benefits lost their exempt status when commingled with
nonexempt funds); Rue & Assocs., Inc. v. White, 71 Va. Cir. 6,9 (2006) (following Bernardini,
despite acknowledging that several federal courts have questioned the decision, in allowing a
judgment creditor to garnish a joint bank account containing exempt Social Security benefits).
133. See U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting state deprivation of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law"); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976)
(announcing a three-factor framework for due process analysis: (1) private interest; (2) "risk of
an erroneous deprivation... and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards"; and (3) government interest).
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that the state statutory scheme violates the Supremacy Clause.' 34 Under the
existing body of case law, her likelihood of success on the merits depends
largely upon the notice and other protections that her state provides. In all
states but Pennsylvania,135 however, a court may construe-and this Note
contends should construe-the statutory scheme to violate both constitutional
provisions referenced above.
A. Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that no
person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."' 36 Federal benefits constitute property, and are thus subject to due
process protections. 137 Due process arguments rest on the analysis that the
Supreme Court set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.'3 8 Noting the flexibility of
procedural due process analysis, the Mathews Court asserted three factors to
weigh in assessing the adequacy of existing pre-deprivation process: (1) the
private interest involved; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation, and value of
additional procedures to prevent it; and (3) the government (or public)
interest.139 Although this test does not fit neatly with the garnishment
scenario's multiple private actors, it does provide a framework for assessing the
light of the interests at stake and potential procedural
deprivation 14in
0
alternatives.
134. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."); see also
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,373 (2000) ("What is a sufficient obstacle
is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and
identifying its purpose and intended effects .... "); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941)
(framing the issue of federal supremacy as whether a state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress").
135. See PA. R.C.P. No. 3111.1 (West Supp. 2008) (banning banks from freezing any
account containing any exempt funds).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
137. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332 ("The interest of an individual in continued receipt of
[Social Security disability] benefits is a statutorily created 'property' interest protected by the
Fifth Amendment.").
at 349 (holding that the Social Security Administration's benefits termination
138. See id.
procedures did not violate due process). For an analysis of debtor due process rights under
Mathews in 1986, see Diana Gribbon Motz & Andrew H. Baida, The Due Process Rights of
PostjudgmentDebtors and Child Support Obligors,45 MD.L. REv. 61, 66-80 (1986).
139. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (identifying the three-factor test);
see also id. at 347 (referring to the government interest factor as "the public interest").
140. See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 84 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., dissenting)
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1. Due Process: Theory
Before examining how courts have assessed due process in the exempt
fund garnishment context, this subpart examines how the three Mathews factors
apply conceptually. The first factor, private interest, clearly implicates the
beneficiary's interest in her benefits-both in freedom from deprivation, and in
uninterrupted access. 14 ' The interests of banks and creditors represent separate
private interests, primarily in maximizing profit and minimizing liability. 42
Although these bank and creditor interests need not conflict with the

beneficiary's interests, most state statutory schemes place bank and beneficiary
interests in unavoidable opposition.
The second factor, risk of erroneous deprivation, includes two types of risk
in this context. First and most severely, a bank may wrongfully transfer benefit
funds to the creditor. 143 Second, an account freeze may deny the beneficiary
access to her benefits for a period of weeks.144 Many state procedures appear to
tolerably ameliorate the first risk type, frequently preventing total deprivation of
freeze,
the benefit. The risk of temporary deprivation through an account
145
however, is not a "risk"-it is a virtual certainty in most states.
(paraphrasing the Mathews test as asking a two-part question: "[H]ow seriously is the
complainant being hurt and how much will it cost to afford him or her a more effective
procedure?"); Granger v. Harris, No. CV-05-3607 (SJF)(ARL), 2007 WL 1213416, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007) (distinguishing a prior judge's refusal to reapply the Mathews
balancing test in light of changed technology).
141. See Finberg,634 F.2d at 58 (noting a "very compelling" debtor interest in funds often
needed for subsistence, and often deprived for two weeks or longer).
142. See id. (noting the creditor's "strong interest in a prompt and inexpensive satisfaction
of the debt"). The Finbergcourt did not mention the bank's interests in its analysis. Banks
often characterize themselves as uninvolved parties caught between the competing interests of
creditors and debtors. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph R. Crouse, Legislative and Regulatory
Counsel, Consumer Bankers Association, at 3 (Nov. 27, 2007), in response to Proposed
Guidance on Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28,
2007) [hereinafter Crouse, Response to Proposed Guidance], available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2007/November/20071129/OP-1294/OP-1294 8 l.pdf("[W]hen a
Garnishment is received, the bank is the innocent third party caught between a creditor and a
debtor, operating without clear rules governing how it is supposed to respond, but having all the
liability if it errs in favor of one side or the other."). Banks do, however, assert their own
independent interests when freezing accounts to avoid liability under state law.
143. See, e.g., infra note 162-164 (identifying a case in which the creditor received the
funds).
144. See, e.g., infra note 165 (identifying a case in which several banks froze the accounts
of several beneficiaries and ultimately released the funds back to the beneficiaries).
145. See Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., No. CV-03-5837(CPS), 2005 WL 2105810,
at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (noting an increased risk of deprivation in the modem era of
electronic deposit and, in New York, electronic restraining notice upon banks).
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The other inquiry under the second Mathews factor, the value of additional
46
procedure, assesses the potential of new processes to protect beneficiaries. 1
Additional procedures provide clear value to the debtor in this context. If
exempt funds are not frozen, beneficiaries suffer neither the near-certain
temporary deprivation nor the possibility of total deprivation.
The third factor, government and public interests, concerns both the cost
to the public of implementing extra procedures to protect the deprived party, as
well as any benefits to the public or government from the change in
procedures. 47 A given set of procedures may have a positive, negative, or
negligible impact on the public interest. In terms of positive impact, the
government interest in keeping beneficiaries out of poverty benefits from
additional procedures.148 On the other side of the ledger, the government must
pay many costs of enforcing and adjudicating new debtor protection laws.
These examples present only two of the numerous ways that new garnishment
procedures would affect the public interest. 149 Courts weigh these impacts
along with the other variables in the Mathews analysis. 50
Balancing these factors, the beneficiary has a substantial interest in
uninterrupted access to subsistence funds, and additional procedures have
considerable value. Beyond implementation, the costs of additional procedures
to the government are negligible. The major costs of additional procedures to

146. For purposes of this discussion, additional procedures include: notice to debtor (in
states not currently requiring notice); a requirement that banks determine whether an account
contains exempt funds before freezing it; and a requirement that creditors verify whether an
account contains exempt funds before seeking a garnishment order.
147. Analytically, one might also view the government interest as including the impact on
banks and creditors as state actors. See Mayers, 2005 WL 2105810, at *9-10 (identifying banks
as state actors when complying with statutory directives to freeze accounts). For example,
procedures requiring creditors to investigate whether funds are exempt prior to issuing a
garnishment summons help debtors at the expense of creditors. See supra note 22 (discussing
this requirement of Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 2716.11 (West 2006)). Similarly, procedures
requiring the bank to assert exemptions on behalf of the beneficiary help debtors at the possible
expense of banks. Whether one considers these impacts as affecting private interest or
government interest matters not; what does matter is that one identifies and weighs these
interests in the due process analysis.
148. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (arguing, on policy grounds, against fees
devolving from freezes).
149. See McCahey v. L.P. Investors, 774 F.2d 543, 549 (2d Cir. 1985) (identifying state
interests in providing rapid judgment collection mechanisms, making "efficient use ofjudicial
resources," and ensuring that creditors do not evade exemption laws).
150. See, e.g., Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 62 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that providing
notice to the debtor "would not place a great burden on the state").
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prevent account freezes fall upon creditors and banks.151 On close examination,
overall long-term costs to banks and creditors also appear minimal.
Modem information technology has reduced the labor needed to identify
exempt funds considerably over the past thirty years.' 52 For a creditor to assess
whether funds in an account are exempt before seeking a garnishment order, a
creditor may simply call or email the bank. For a bank to determine whether
funds are exempt before freezing them, the bank reviews recent electronic
deposits to determine whether they constitute exempt funds. 5 3 Automation has
the potential to further simplify this process for banks and creditors alike. 54
This calculation should also include cost savings to creditors and banks. If
a creditor identifies that funds are exempt before issuing a garnishment
summons, costs are limited to the inquiry identifying the exemption. A creditor
not identifying this exemption up front will continue pursuing the funds,
incurring all of the procedural costs through the exemption hearing, and will
still end up unable to recover the exempt funds. 55 Banks also currently face
time-consuming procedures when responding to garnishment orders. 56 If the
bank may assert the exemption up front, however, it avoids all subsequent
response costs.

151. In measuring the private interests of banks and creditors, one must limit consideration
to those interests that comply with federal law. Absent this limitation, procedures affording
minimal debtor protection maximize bank and creditor profits-the bank gains maximum fees
and the creditor collects maximum debt when the debtor has minimal notice of garnishment and
her right to contest it. However, to the extent that profit maximization seizes exempt funds in
violation of federal law, due process analysis should not take illicit private interests into
consideration.
152. Thirty years ago, a bank needed to manually locate and review all deposits into the
account, examining each paper source to determine exempt status. Today, a bank's computer
system stores (or could store) all information needed to assess exemptions. Although systems
interface and accounting issues point to areas of potential further improvement, see infra Part
V.A. 1, the ability of banks to identify exemptions has already improved greatly over the past
three decades.
153. See Beggs, Response to Proposed Guidance, supra note 14, at 4-5 (describing the
bank's process for identifying exempt funds and declining to freeze the account if only exempt
funds were deposited within the past ninety days). Identifying funds deposited by check may
prove more difficult, see id. at 5, although process and technology enhancements may reduce
the manual processing required for identifying check deposits as well.
154. See infra Parts V.A.2 and V.B (discussing potential improvements to both the
government system of encoding benefits and banking information technology systems-for the
benefit of both creditors and banks-to identify exempt funds).
155. This argument postulates a debtor who is willing and able to assert her rights.
156. See, e.g., Beggs, Response to Proposed Guidance, supra note 14, at 6-7 (describing
the complex and resource-intensive nature of garnishment processing).
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2. Due Process: Application in Court
Not surprisingly, the success of due process challenges varies according to
the nature of the state law challenged. Challenges to laws that do not provide
notice to the debtor of garnishment, exemptions, and right to a hearing have
met with resounding success. Challenges to laws that do provide notice to the
debtor have not fared so well. Two recent courts, however, have demonstrated
a willingness to reconsider due process in light of technological advances.
As noted in subpart III.B above, cases such as Harris v. Bailey have
declared due process violations when state statutory schemes have failed to
provide notice to the debtor. 57 Beginning with Finbergv. Sullivan'58 in 1980,
virtually every court reviewing a state statutory scheme that failed to provide
notice has invalidated the statute. For cases in which the debtor received notice
but with less than a full explanation
of exemptions and hearing request
59
procedures, courts have split.1
If the debtor received notice of garnishment, exemptions and right to a
hearing, most courts have held such procedure to comport with due process
requirements. One case explicitly stated that a beneficiary was not entitled to
"self-executing exemptions"' 60 in denying a challenge to the bank's freezing of
his account. Another case explicitly declined to reweigh due process factors in
61
light of modem technology.1
Two recent New York cases, however, have made a bit of headway in
challenging state schemes that provide notice but allow freezes. Granger v.
62
Harris1
held that the debtor stated a claim when he alleged that the creditor
157.

See Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966, 970 (W.D. Va. 1983) (invalidating the

Virginia procedure); see also supra note 98 (describing two declarations of state no-notice
garnishment laws as unconstitutional, and identifying subsequent remediation by both state
legislatures).
158. See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 62 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that statutes failing
to require notice to plaintiff of garnishment, exemptions, and right to hearing violated due
process).
159.

Compare Reigh v. Schleigh, 784 F.2d 1191, 1199 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a

statutory scheme failing to provide a complete list of exemptions did not violate due process),
with Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1354 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding that despite actual notice

received by debtor, "Rhode Island ha[d] not provided judgment debtors ... with sufficient,
defined procedural process to meet the requirements of the due process clause").
160.

Zeppieri v. New Haven Provision Co., 163 F. Supp. 2d 126, 138 (D. Conn. 2001).

Although not mentioned in the opinion, the Connecticut law requiring a bank to leave $1,000
accessible in accounts containing exempt funds, CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-367b(c) (West
2005 & Supp. 2008), may have influenced the court's refusal to find a due process violation.
161. See Huggins v. Pataki, No. 01-CV-3016(JG), 2002 WL 1732804, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July
11, 2002) (suggesting that the plaintiff direct his valid concerns to the state legislature).

162.

See Granger v. Harris, No. CV-05-3607 (SJF)(ARL), 2007 WL 1213416, at *8-9
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deprived him of due process rights under color of state law. 163 In this case,
however, the bank did not just freeze the funds but distributed them to the
creditor. 164 In Mayers v. New York Community Bancorp,Inc.,165 the court went
even further, denying the bank's summary judgment motion on a due process
claim in which the account was frozen but the funds were not disbursed to the
creditor. 66 These two cases give beneficiaries a modest precedential basis for
challenging any state statutory scheme that allows freezing of exempt funds.
B. Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause operates differently from the due process clause,
applying only when comparing federal law to state law. In the exempt fund
garnishment context, the most common Supremacy Clause argument assesses
the relationship between 42 U.S.C. § 407, which "imposes a broad bar against
the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits," 167 and state
garnishment laws conflicting therewith. 168 Supreme Court precedent clearly
and unequivocally rejects state law that allows permanent deprivation of
benefits in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 407.169 Courts have differed, however,
as to whether laws allowing temporary deprivation of funds-with a possible
permanent deprivation if debtor does not assert her rights-violate the
Supremacy Clause. 170 Given the "all-inclusive" 17 1 language of 42 U.S.C.

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007) (holding that the plaintiff stated a claim that state procedures violated
his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
163. Id.
164. See id.at *2 (describing the bank's assessment of a $100 fee before closing the
account and sending the remaining funds to the creditor).
165. See Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., No. CV-03-5837(CPS), 2005 WL 2105810,
at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005) (holding that plaintiff stated a valid due process claim).
166. Id.
167. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413,417 (1973).
168. See, e.g., Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966, 971-72 (W.D. Va. 1983) (assessing the
Virginia statutory scheme in light of 42 U.S.C. § 407 and finding a Supremacy Clause
violation).
169. See Philpott,409 U.S. at 417 (holding that the Supremacy Clause banned a state from
garnishing Social Security benefits).
170. Compare Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding a Supremacy
Clause violation), with Huggins v. Pataki, No. 01-CV-3016(JG), 2002 WL 1732804, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002) ("[T]he possibility of a temporary loss of access to benefits does not
constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).").
171. Philpott,409 U.S. at 415.
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§ 407, the failure of some courts to include an account freeze within the
prohibition's purview warrants closer inspection.
In assessing the relationship of 42 U.S.C. § 407 to state laws that allow
account freezes, the word "subject" and the term "legal process" emerge as the
most crucial determinants of conflict between state and federal law.' 72 The
word "subject" mitigates strongly toward finding an account freeze
unconstitutional. Congress did not state that benefits shall not be deprived by
garnishment or other legal process-but that they shall not be subject to legal
process. A plain-language understanding of "subject" in this context warrants
shielding the benefit from the vicissitudes of any legal action, particularly
action ultimate aiming-and sometimes succeeding-to permanently divest the
beneficiary of her exempt funds.
The "legal process" prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 407 presents a somewhat
slipperier concept. The Supreme Court recently addressed the definitional
question in Washington State Department
of Social & Health Services v.
173
Keffeler:
of
Estate
Guardianship
"[O]ther legal process" should be understood to be process much like the
processes of execution, levy, attachment, and garnishment, and at a
minimum, would seem to require utilization of some judicial or quasijudicial mechanism, though not necessarily an elaborate one, by which
control over property passes from one person to another in order to
discharge74 or secure discharge of an allegedly existing or anticipated
liability. 1

In Keffeler, the Supreme Court unanimously held that assignment of foster
children's Social Security75 benefits to the state for foster care expenses did not
constitute legal process.
Freezing exempt funds pursuant to a garnishment order, however,
distinguishes itself markedly from Keffeler-the account freeze is not made
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000) ("The right of any person to any future payment under
this title shall not be... subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal
process. .. .") (emphasis added).
173. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537
U.S. 371, 385 (2003) (holding that a state's garnishment of childrens' Social Security benefits
to reimburse itself for foster care expenses did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 407).
174. Id. at385.
175. Id. at 375. The Court listed two primary justifications for this holding. First, the
statutory benefits regulation scheme specifically allowed this type of assignment to the state as
payee, and 42 U.S.C. § 407 should not be read as inconsistent therewith. Id. at 384 n.7.
Second, canons of statutory construction suggested that this state process was not similar
enough to the relevant statutory term (garnishment) for inclusion within the statute's protection.
Id. at 384-85.
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pursuant to federal law, and provides nothing positive for the beneficiary.
More importantly, the account freeze, particularly when made on behalf of a
consumer creditor, fits comfortably within the Supreme Court's definition of
legal process. The freeze is executed pursuant to a garnishment order-a type
of legal process explicitly mentioned in the statute.1 76 It flows directly from
explicit judicial instruction not to release the funds. "[C]ontrol over property
passes from one person to another"'177 when the bank freezes the account.
Moreover, the sole purpose of the freeze is to "secure discharge of an allegedly
existing or anticipated liability"' 7 -without the court order, the freeze itself
would be illegal process. Viewing the freeze as either an extension of the
garnishment order or as a separate legal process, it lies squarely within the
broad parameters of 42 U.S.C. § 407.
Case law provides little analysis of the Supremacy Clause's applicability
to account freezes. Some cases, in finding a no-notice statute to violate the
Supremacy Clause, have construed a long interruption of benefits as
incompatible with 42 U.S.C. § 407.179 In the same opinions, however, the
courts promoted a prompt hearing on the exemption as a cure.180 Such
language implies that the length of the deprivation determines whether state and
federal law conflict. The federal statute, however, makes no allowance for any
length of deprivation.
At some point, evaluating the compatibility of state and federal law
requires judicial line-drawing. A year-long deprivation would undeniably
violate 42 U.S.C. § 407. A shorter deprivation may lead a court to allow a
freeze of several weeks.' 8' Statutory language and the Supreme Court's
interpretation thereof,18 2 however, demand that judges draw the line at the
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (mandating that benefits "shall not be... subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment,or other legal process") (emphasis added).
177. Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 385.
178. Id.
179. See Harris v. Bailey, 574 F. Supp. 966, 969, 972 (W.D. Va. 1983) (finding that "a
prompt post-seizure hearing is constitutionally required," and that Virginia garnishment law
violated the Supremacy Clause by denying access to exempt funds "for a long period of time");
Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding a Supremacy
Clause violation because "the lack of a meaningful opportunity for prompt hearing suggests that
the interruption in benefits for one who wished to challenge the enforcement could be
significant").
180. See supra note 179 (noting the calls for prompt hearings in Deary and Harris v.
Bailey).
181. See Huggins v. Pataki, No. 01-CV-3016(JG), 2002 WL 1732804, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July
11, 2002) (rejecting plaintiff's Supremacy Clause argument despite a deprivation of at least
several weeks, though not specifying the exact length of the deprivation).
182. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (identifying the "broad bar" against
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moment of deprivation. Drawing it anywhere else invites speculation and
ensures fragmentation of case law interpreting a federal statute that should
apply uniformly.
Mayers, a recent New York case, provides a precedential leg to stand on
when arguing that an account freeze of any duration violates the Supremacy
Clause. In denying the bank's motion for summary judgment, the Mayers court
held that plaintiffs stated facts sufficient to support their Supremacy Clause
argument-that the state law obstructed "the purpose of [42 U.S.C.] § 407 to
ensure that recipients have the resources necessary to meet their most basic
needs." 1 83 In Granger,the court also recognized Mayers's Supremacy Clause
84
argument, although the plaintiff in Granger did not make this contention.'
These two cases, while not exactly foreshadowing a revolution in exempt fund
garnishment jurisprudence, provide persuasive reasoning for finding bank
freezes to violate the Supremacy Clause if the account contained any
reasonably identifiable exempt funds.
V Publicand Private Solutions
Thus far, this Note has examined the many challenges facing the persons
and institutions that exempt fund garnishment affects. This Part moves from
challenges to solutions, discussing various steps that public and private actors
can take to minimize the incidence of freezes, fees, and garnishment. This Part
does not provide a comprehensive list of fixes, but rather suggests
approaches-from single-beneficiary action to federal legislation-to combat
the numerous problems facing beneficiary debtors.
A. Public Solutions
Numerous public actors play a role in shaping the garnishment processes
that affect exempt funds. Legislatures define (or neglect to define) the
processes that private actors must follow and the burdens each party must bear.
tampering with exempt benefits); supra note 174 and accompanying text (defining "legal
process" to include procedures similar to garnishment and involving judicial action).
183. Mayers v. N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc., No. CV-03-5837(CPS), 2005 WL 2105810, at
* 17 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31,2005). The court limited the ruling to accounts containing only directly
deposited exempt funds. Id.
184. See Granger v. Harris, No. CV-05-3607 (SJF)(ARL), 2007 WL 1213416, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007) (noting that the Supremacy Clause rationale in Mayers may not have
applied if argued because the account did not contain solely exempt funds).
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Administrative agencies interpret (or decline to interpret) existing legislation as
needed through regulations and guidance, filling in the specifics that statutes do
not address.18 5 Courts step in (or stand aside) when beneficiaries challenge
statutes and regulations permitting exempt fund garnishment. Legislatures
stand in the best position to effect comprehensive change, but legislative inertia
does not foreclose all opportunities for improvement. Regulations can promote
interpretations of existing laws favorable to beneficiaries, and courts may be in
position to encourage legislative change. 186
1. Legislative Solutions
Congress, with a few quick strokes of its proverbial pen, could virtually
eliminate exempt fund account freezes with a simple five-point plan.18 7 First,
the legislation would order the Department of Treasury to promulgate
regulations ensuring that its Automated Clearing House (ACH) codes clearly
identify exempt federal benefits. Second, it would require any creditor
excepted from the ban on garnishing benefits to indicate its favored status on
the garnishment order. 88 Third, it would require banks to assert exemptions on
behalf of depositors whose benefits are deposited electronically and provide
safe harbor for erroneous good faith exemption claims. Fourth, it would
implement an accounting system that enables banks to identify the specific
dollar amount of funds to exempt within an account. Finally, the legislation
would provide for administrative enforcement in addition to a private right of
action.
The first element, requiring that the systems interfacing between the
Department of Treasury and banks make all exemptions readily identifiable by
the banks' automated systems, contains too much technical detail to cover
thoroughly in this Note. Suffice it to say, banks have complained of difficulty
in identifying exemptions based on the information that the ACH codes provide

185. Although courts may perform rulemaking that impacts exempt fund garnishment, see
supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (describing the Virginia Supreme Court Rules
Committee's change to garnishment forms), this Note considers judicial administrative
rulemaking as conceptually distinct from agency rulemaking.
186. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing two judicial findings of
statutory schemes' constitutional inadequacy, and subsequent amendment of those two states'
statutes).
187. A draft of this proposed legislation appears later in this subsection.
188. See supranote 44 and accompanying text (identifying the familial and governmental
creditors allowed to garnish exempt funds by federal statute).
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with each transaction. 89 Technical experts are best suited to define the specific
codes that would allow banks to clearly identify exempt federal benefits. Under
the current system, banks cannot clearly identify that some deposits are
benefits, although banks can identify that these deposits originated from a
government agency. 190 If the bank cannot identify the exemption from the
ACH codes, the bank must conduct further inquiry into the transaction to
determine whether it contains exempt benefits. Such inquiry increases both
costs to banks and error rates in identifying exemptions. Modification of ACH
codes to ensure that banks receiving the electronic benefits deposit have all
information needed to identify exemptions would eliminate the need for manual
exemption identification and the problems associated therewith.' 9'
The second element, a requirement that preferred creditors indicate their
preferred status on a garnishment order,' 92 would specifically preempt state law.
To implement this requirement, states would add a paragraph to the
garnishment order instructing creditors to check a box if any provision of
federal law allows the creditor to garnish otherwise exempt funds.'9" This
requirement would inform the bank that it should proceed with the garnishment
order despite a general exemption, according to the limitations prescribed by
the CCPA. 94
189. See Keller, Response to Proposed Guidance, supra note 109, at 2 (recommending a
transaction code to identify exempt funds); Letter from Daniel W. Morton, Senior Counsel,
Huntington National Bank, at 4 (Nov. 27, 2007), in response to Proposed Guidance on
Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28,2007), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2007/November/20071129/OP- 1294/OP-1294 5
1.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (requesting standardization of ACH benefit codes to facilitate
bank identification of specific benefits) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
190. See Keller, Response to Proposed Guidance, supra note 109, app. (providing an
illustration of information the bank receives with an electronic deposit). Some benefits can be
clearly identified from the contents of the "description" field (e.g., "SOC SEC" means Social
Security Benefits; "SUPP SEC" means Supplemental Security Income benefits). Id. Other
transactions, however, are not identifiable as benefit payments and could conceivably constitute
government employee salary deposits.
191. The Social Security Administration has reached a similar conclusion, identifying ACH
code modification as the first of four "potential safeguards to protect Social Security recipients."
SSA REPORT, supra note 4, at 10. The American Bankers Association concurs with this
recommendation. Id. app. F at F-4.
192. This objective may also be accomplished by requiring creditors to garnish benefits
directly from the benefits-administering agency. SSA, for example, maintains a Court Ordered
Garnishment System (COGS) to pay domestic relations and government creditors directly out of
the recipients' benefits; total funds garnished in this manner amounted to nearly $418 million in
fiscal year 2007. SSA REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
193. For a list of these preferred credit obligations, see supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
194. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing garnishment limitations).
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The third element, requiring banks to assert exemptions on behalf of
depositors, constitutes the heart of the legislation. 95 The requirement is as
simple as it is important: When banks receive garnishment orders, they must
investigate the account to ensure that it contains no exempt funds before
freezing it. If the account contains only exempt funds, the bank informs the
creditor that nothing in the account may be garnished. To ensure that banks do
not incur liability for allowing beneficiaries to withdraw funds, the legislation
should96also provide a safe harbor for banks asserting exemptions in good
faith.

The fourth element provides for a universal accounting method that
determines precisely which funds are exempt when nonexempt funds are
commingled with the exempt funds. 197 This element is needed for uniform
effectuation of the third element. Although no exact statistics are available,
banks assert that the majority of accounts containing exempt funds also contain
not only nonexempt funds but also funds deposited by a joint accountholder.' 98
Commingling thus presents a significant challenge to determining the extent of
an exemption. 199 The most beneficiary-friendly accounting mechanism, the
"First In, Last Out" principle, considers all nonexempt funds withdrawn before
195. The SSA OIG report provides inferential support for this proposition, in suggesting
that the Social Security Administration "revisit its interpretation of the garnishment exemption
provision for Social Security benefits to determine if it should be an absolute bar against the
imposition of the freeze or hold." SSA REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
196. Connecticut and Pennsylvania currently have such provisions at the state level. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-367b(o) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (providing good faith
immunity for banks making "bona fide error[s]" in attempting to prevent garnishment of exempt
funds); PA. R.C.P. No. 3111.1 (West Supp. 2008) (exempting all funds in an account in which
funds are deposited electronically on a regularly recurring basis). The American Bankers
Association would like to extend this safe harbor to banks when a creditor asserts an exception
to the exemption that would allow a domestic relations or governmental creditor to garnish
exempt funds. SSA REPORT, supra note 4, app. F at F-6.
197. The SSA OIG report also recommends establishment of a universal accounting
method, although it does not endorse any method in particular. SSA REPORT, supra note 4, at
11.
198. See Letter from Chris Scribner, Vice President, Regions Financial Corp., at 2 (Nov.
27, 2007), in responseto Proposed Guidance on Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit Funds,
72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
SECRS/2007/November/20071127/OP-1294/OP-1294_6_1.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2008)
("[T]he majority of exempt funds at Regions are deposited into jointly-held accounts, where the
balance is legally owned by multiple customers.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).

199. Although banks contend that separation of exempt from nonexempt funds presents an
insurmountable challenge, courts must perform this separation under current law to determine
the extent of exemptions. See supra note 36 (contrasting the views of a bank and a consumer
advocate).
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any exempt funds are withdrawn. °° Whether the law mandates this accounting
principle or a different one, the mandate will give banks the clear direction
needed to uniformly segregate commingled funds into their exempt and
nonexempt portions. Once the law establishes the principle, banks can
incorporate it into their information systems to track both the exempt and
nonexempt balance of an account at all times, facilitating compliance with
garnishment requests.
Finally, the legislation should provide an administrative enforcement
mechanism, while specifically granting a private right of action. A private right
of action allows any aggrieved beneficiary to assert her rights. The threat of
government enforcement would serve as an additional motivational tool to spur
compliance. Allowing both public and private actions provides for maximum
deterrence. Ideally, aggressive early enforcement would prod all banks to
comply soon after the law is passed. Because the major costs of compliance
come during implementation, the need for enforcement should decrease over
time to almost nothing once banks implement new exemption identification and
assertion technology and procedures. The Department of Justice Office of
Consumer Litigation, which already enforces violations of the CCPA and
FDCPA, among other enforcement responsibilities on behalf of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), 20 1 appears best equipped to handle enforcement.
As a less comprehensive (but still beneficial) interim solution, Congress
could propose blanket exemptions similar to those in California or Connecticut;
for example, ensuring that $1,000 remains accessible to the depositor.20 2 This
solution has relatively low implementation costs and ensures access to enough
funds for beneficiaries to avoid complete destitution. It would require the
definition of a "look-back" period to define how far in the past a bank would
need to check for directly deposited exempt funds.20 3 Although potentially both
overinclusive (denying garnishment of nonexempt funds under the threshold)
200. See Saunders, Frozen Out, supra note 4, at 5, 16 n.38 (describing, exemplifying, and
recommending this accounting method).
201. See Office of Consumer Litig., Other Acts Administered by the FTC,
http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/ocl/monograph/other-ftc.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (describing
laws that the Office enforces) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
202. See supra notes 37, 87 (describing California and Connecticut requirements that
banks make a certain portion of any account containing electronically deposited exempt funds
available to the depositor); see also infraPart V.A. 1 (proposing this interim solution as part of a
broader legislative package).
203. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-367b(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (defining
the look-back period as thirty days); see also SSA REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (identifying the
need to define a look-back period). This note recommends a ninety-day look-back period to
ensure maximum beneficiary protection.
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and underinclusive (allowing freezing of exempt funds exceeding the
threshold), it provides far greater beneficiary protection than most states
mandate today. Several banks have endorsed this approach. 2°
Although only Congress has the power to solve the problem nationwide,
every state has the power to prevent federal benefit freezes within its borders,
although not the power to compel regulations that would enable full
automation. States can also expand protection to include state law exemptions
in addition to the federal ones. California, Connecticut, New York, and
20 5
Pennsylvania all provide models for beneficiary protection statutes.
Additionally, states may require creditors to investigate whether an account
contains exempt funds before issuing a garnishment order, as does Ohio.2 °
This Note recommends federal legislation as the optimal solution to
exempt fund garnishment problems because Congress stands in the best
position to drive meaningful change for federal beneficiaries. Federal
legislation would clearly preempt state law, eliminating the disparities currently
causing fragmented application of federal exemption laws.20 7 Congressional
action would not face litigation challenging its authority as would federal
agency action. Legislation also cannot be overturned or circumvented as easily
as regulatory action, which may be reversed without the safeguards of the
deliberative democratic process.

204. See supra note 109 (describing two banks' endorsement of the California model).
205. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing these four states'
extraordinary beneficiary protections).
206. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2716.11 (West 2006) (requiring creditors to have a
reasonable basis for believing the bank has nonexempt funds of the judgment debtor).
207. Some banks have argued that any federal regulation affecting garnishment processes
inappropriately impinges on state sovereignty (see, e.g., Letter from Charles A. Stones,
President, Kansas Bankers Association, at 3 (Oct. 29, 2007), in response to Proposed Guidance
on Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28, 2007),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2007/October/20071030/OP-1294/OP1294_2_1.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) ("We believe that procedural matters such as these are
the purview of the state lawmakers.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This
author disagrees. National interests in benefits administration and consumer protection (both
frequent targets of federal legislation) override any state interest in maintaining the current
garnishment procedures. Furthermore, states have no strong policy reasons for maintaining
disparate garnishment processes. Even viewing states as "laboratories of democracy," New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)), the four firstclass states have, through experimentation, developed procedures that protect benefits well.
Realizing the full value of these experiments requires bringing their beneficial results to the
entire nation. States may assert a right to provide greater degrees of preference to creditors and
debtors, but this interest cannot trump a legitimate exercise of congressional power. State
garnishment laws may fill gaps in federal legislation, but they do not occupy a separate, superior
sphere of sovereignty over the garnishment process.
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Congress has made one attempt at addressing the exempt fund
garnishment problem through legislation. In April of 2008, Senators Kohl and
McCaskill introduced the Illegal Garnishment Prevention Act.20 8 Despite its
encouraging name, however, the act would only prevent the Social Security
Administration from using funds to promote direct deposit until they developed
proposed regulations to solve the exempt fund garnishment problem 2°9 -that is
to say, it is very short on substance. Additionally, the act implies that direct
deposit itself is a bad idea, when on the whole, direct deposit produces
efficiencies that help both beneficiaries and agencies when the system works
well. One positive element is the bill's grant of clear authority to the
Department of the Treasury to issue regulations addressing the problem. 2 10 As
of this writing, the bill has not escaped committee.
So as not to criticize without suggesting an alternative solution, this Note
proposes the following draft legislation:
An Act
To protect federally exempt benefit funds from freezes, fees and
garnishment.
Section 1. Short Title.
(a) This Act may be cited as the "Benefits Protection
Act of 2009."
TITLE I-Interim Uniform Exemption
Section 101. Interim Exemption requirement
(a) Immediately upon the effective date of this act,
all depository institutions will, upon receipt of a
garnishment order, ensure that the accountholder
retains access to the lower of the account balance
or $1,000 if the account contains exempt funds
deposited electronically within ninety days of the
date the institution receives the garnishment
order.
(b) No institution shall be held liable under any state
garnishment law for an erroneous good-faith
208. Illegal Garnishment Prevention Act, S. 2850, 110th Cong. (2008).
209. Id. § 2(b).
210. Id. (granting the Treasury Secretary clear authority, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 407, to
establish regulations to ensure protection of Social Security benefits). However, such
regulations would cover only Social Security benefits, not other exempt benefits such as
Veterans' and Federal Civil Service Retirement benefits. See supra note 3 (listing categories of
exempt federal benefits).
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assertion of exemption when acting pursuant to
subsection (a) of this Section. Any party
challenging the institution's good faith shall bear
the burden of proving bad faith.
(c) Subsection (a) does not supersede any state law
exempting an amount greater than $1,000 from
freezing.
(d) This Title shall cease to have any force or effect
when the provisions of Title II have been fully
implemented.
TITLE H-Full Identification and Assertion of
Exemptions
Section 201. Department of Treasury to Promulgate Interface
Code
(a) Within one year after the effective date of this
Act, the Department of the Treasury shall
promulgate regulations modifying Automated
Clearing House (ACH) codes for electronically
deposited benefits to include all information
necessary for a depository institution's
information technology system to identify the
exempt status of the benefit.
(b) The ACH codes shall identify all federally
exempt benefits, including but not limited to:
(i) Social Security benefits under 42 U.S.C.
§ 407(a);
(ii) Supplemental Security Income benefits under
42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(1);
(iii) Veterans' benefits under 38 U.S.C.
§ 5301(a)(1);
(iv) Federal Civil Service Retirement benefits
under 5 U.S.C. § 8346; and
(v) Federal Railroad Retirement benefits under
45 U.S.C. § 231m.
(c) Supplemental Security Income benefits in
subsection (b)(ii) shall be identifiable as benefits
that may not be garnished for any purpose.
(d) The protections granted under this Section stand
in addition to any protections granted by state
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law; this Section shall not be construed to limit a
debtor's right to assert any exemptions granted to
the debtor by state law.
Section 202. Identification of Preferred Familial and
Governmental Creditors (adding 15 U.S.C. § 1673a)
(a) All state garnishment forms shall give creditors
the opportunity to indicate whether they meet any
of the following qualifications:
i. Child Support or Alimony Creditor pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 659(a);
ii. Federal Tax Creditor pursuant to 26 U.S.C.
§§ 633 1(h) or 6334(c); or
iii. Federal Administrative Creditor pursuant to
31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(A).
(b) Creditors failing to indicate preferred status
according to subsection (a) shall not garnish the
exempt funds identified in § 201(b) above.
Section 203. Depository Institutions to Assert Exemptions on
Behalf of Federal Beneficiaries (adding 15 U.S.C. § 1673b):
(a) Any institution receiving by electronic deposit
funds exempted from legal process under
§ 201(b) shall assert that exemption on behalf of
a beneficiary accountholder upon receipt of a
garnishment order.
(b) No institution shall limit accountholder access to
federal benefits funds for any length of time in
response to a garnishment order.
(c) No institution shall be liable under any state
garnishment law for an erroneous good-faith
assertion of an exemption when acting pursuant
to subsection (a) of this section. Any party
challenging the institution's good faith shall bear
the burden of proving bad faith.
Section 204. Method of Distinguishing Exempt from
Nonexempt Funds in a Commingled Account (adding 15
U.S.C. § 1673c):
(a) A bank acting pursuant to § 203(a) shall use the
First In, Last Out accounting method when
determining the extent of the exemption to an
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account containing both exempt and nonexempt
funds.2 1'
Section 205. Private and Public Rights of Action (amending
15 U.S.C. § 1676):
(a) Section 1676 of Title 15 of the United States
Code shall be amended as follows:
-after "title," insert "other than 15 U.S.C.
§ 1673a-c, which shall be enforced in
administrative proceedings by the Federal Trade
Commission, and shall also be subject to private
rights of action by depositors."
The interim provisions of § 101 above would provide far better beneficiary
protection than the current systems in most states that allow account freezes and
enable transfer of funds to creditors when beneficiaries do not assert their
exemptions. The long-term provisions of §§ 201-205 would provide a solution
for banks to effectively assert the exact amount of the exemption. Congress
should work towards enacting any elements of this legislation upon which it
can reach consensus. In a situation that leaves ever more beneficiaries destitute
with each passing week, the perfect solution should not stand as an obstacle to a
good solution.
2. Administrative Solutions
Federal regulations and state legislation hold significant promise for
helping beneficiary debtors. Federal agencies could accomplish all that
congressional legislation could, except for the enforcement mechanism. State
legislatures can bring significant debtor protection to beneficiaries within their
borders. Though federal regulations and state legislation have certain
weaknesses, they could effectuate many improvements that private action
cannot.
Two types of federal agencies have the power to issue regulations
protecting beneficiaries: (1) agencies administering benefits; and (2) agencies
regulating financial institutions. For the first type, each agency that administers
benefits could issue regulations interpreting its benefits as not subject to
211. Alternatively, the legislation could leave the accounting method to the bank's
discretion, similarly to at least one existing state law that leaves the accounting method to the
discretion of the debtor asserting the exemption. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-610(3) (2007)
("Proceeds are traceable under this section by application of the principles of first-in first-out,
last-in first-out, or any other reasonable basis for tracing selected by the judgment debtor.").
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account freezes. For example, the Social Security Administration could issue
regulations that incorporate most elements of the legislation above to ban
benefit freezes. These regulations, however, would apply only to Social
Security benefits and could compel neither ACH code modification nor
alteration of enforcement mechanisms, rendering them inferior to a legislative
solution. Ideally, all agencies that administer benefits would collaborate to
issue regulations applicable to all benefit types to prevent further fragmentation
of law in this area. Still, benefits agencies
would need to rely on banking
212
agencies to enforce their regulations.
The second type of federal agency with authority in this area, the banking
agency, 213 could issue regulations that cover all of the proposed legislation
above except the enforcement mechanism. These agencies have not ignored
the matter, although they have not yet taken meaningful action. In September
2007, four agencies issued proposed guidance on the issue, requesting public
comment.2 14 The guidance proposed a list of best practices that did not
challenge account freezes. 2 15 The proposed guidance may prove to have some
value in promoting dialogue between banks and government. The direct impact
of the guidance itself, however, is zero--it mandates nothing and recommends
no concrete action, as recognized by an interested Senator.216
Independently of this initiative, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
recently issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking affecting exempt
fund garnishment.2 17 Although only one line in the proposal addressed exempt
fund garnishment, the line tackled the issue head-on: It proposed to label
212. See SSA REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 ("If SSA interprets the garnishment exemption
provision as an absolute bar, then [banking] regulators (such as Treasury, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Credit Unions etc.) need to enforce SSA's interpretation.").
213. These banking agencies include the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the
Federal Reserve Board (FRB), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).
214. See Proposed Guidance on Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed.
Reg. 55,273, 55,274-75 (Sept. 28,2007) (seeking comments on proposed guidance and asking
broad questions about bank practices).
215. See id. at 55,275 (suggesting prompt notice, cost minimization, and lifting a freeze as
soon as possible).
216. See Frozen Out: A Review of Bank Treatment of SocialSecurity Benefits: Hearing
Before the S. Finance Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Baucus, Frozen Out],
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/statements/092007mb.pdf (statement of Sen. Max
Baucus, Chairman, S. Fin. Comm., 2) (stating that he "had high hopes" for the joint agency
guidance, but that the draft guidance "disappointed" him).
217. See Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,570,43,574-75 (proposed
Aug. 6, 2007) (considering a "Targeted Practices Approach" that would list exempt fund
account freezing and bank fee set-off as unfair and deceptive practices).
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account freezes, and fees charged pursuant thereto, as unfair and deceptive acts
or practices (UDAP).218 Although this approach would leave banks (and likely
the courts) to sort out the details, it would be a step in the right direction. The
Department of the Treasury could also accomplish the goals of this approach by
amending the original regulations that established direct deposit to explicitly
disallow account freezes.219
Although banking agencies may promulgate regulations, the banking
agencies indicate that benefits agencies, as holders of primary authority over
benefits administration, are better positioned to regulate. 220 Banking agencies
22
may even question benefits agencies' very authority to issue regulations. '
Overall, benefits agencies appear to possess a more solid foundation of
authority for administering regulations, but banking agencies appear better able
to regulate comprehensively. Still, regulations from either type of agency could
provide real value to beneficiaries, although without the strength or breadth of
federal legislation.
Benefits agencies can also help their beneficiaries in other ways. These
agencies can specifically inform and educate beneficiaries regarding their
exemption rights. 222 Benefits agencies can also encourage beneficiaries to seek
legal advice if they have any concerns or questions about exemption laws
(which, as anyone who has read this far can attest, are far from straightforward
in their operation).
Federal regulation, particularly when coordinated amongst multiple
agencies, could prove quite helpful. Codification of the OTS proposed
rulemaking to include account freezes in the UDAP scheme would severely
218. Id. at 43,575.
219. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing the regulations governing direct
deposit of benefits); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Bankers Association in Support
of Defendant-Appellee HSBC Bank USA at 25, Huggins v. Pataki, No. 02-7950 (2d Cir. 2003),
available at 2003 WL 23475663 (citing the existing regulation for the proposition that the
department rejected consumer group requests to prohibit bank attachment of any funds).
220. See Kelsey, Frozen Out, supra note 108, at 11 ("[T1he agencies responsible for
implementation and interpretation of their benefit programs... are in the best position to
provide guidance on the garnishment exemption issue.").
221. Compare Williams, Frozen Out, supra note 35, at 11 (deferring to agencies as to
whether they have authority to issue regulations preventing benefits freezes), with Saunders,
Frozen Out, supra note 4, at 7 (contending that banking agencies have authority to regulate;
"federal banking agencies have provided numerous regulations and guidance preempting and
interpreting state laws for the benefit of their regulated institutions").
222. Such action would raise the possibility that some beneficiaries may abuse this
privilege, running up consumer debt without intending to pay it. However, one wonders who
would knowingly choose the life of constant hounding by creditors that comes with nonpayment
of consumer debt. Congress could pass legislation to address such abuses if they did arise.
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discourage (if not eliminate) freezes.223 More detailed regulations could
address the problem even more comprehensively. Federal regulation does,
however, pose two distinct disadvantages. First, banks and creditors would
likely litigate to challenge the authority of agencies to issue regulations banning
freezes. The regulations would get some deference 224 and would probably
withstand a challenge to authority, but the risk of failure detracts from the
desirability of regulating as opposed to legislating. Second, these regulations
could not effectively define public and private rights of action as could
congressional legislation.
State regulations, following the models of the extraordinary debtor
protection states, can give citizens in other states these same protections.225
States may also adopt versions of the Ohio provision that places a burden upon
debt collectors to verify exemptions before obtaining a garnishment order.226
This Ohio approach provides considerable protection,227 although not to the
extent of the first-class states; it still allows freezes, and a debtor who never
asserts the exemption will lose it regardless of the creditor's duty, while the law
also places a substantial burden on creditors. Ideally, states would adopt duties
for both creditors and banks to serve as a double-hulled safeguard against
exempt fund garnishment. The major disadvantages to state action as opposed
to federal legislation (aside from the obvious jurisdictional limitation) are
(1) the further fragmentation of federal law, and (2) the inability to compel
automation and enforcement provisions.
State administrative measures may also influence the process. Even in
states that specify procedural requirements in great detail, state agencies may
223. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (describing the proposed rule). This
regulation would, however, leave two important questions unanswered. First, what happens
when exempt and nonexempt funds are commingled? Second, what happens to preferred
domestic support or governmental creditors? The single-sentence OTS regulation, while
admirable and desirable, does not comprehensively address this complex issue.
224. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001) (comparing the
deferential standard that courts give agency regulations when Congress expressly delegates
rulemaking authority to the purely persuasive value of regulations issued without such
delegation).
225. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (describing first-class states).
226. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing Ohio law).
227. This protection may be even stronger if a recent class certification of plaintiffs
alleging violations of the Ohio Code is any indication. In Stewart v. Cheek & Zeehandelar,
LLP, 252 F.R.D. 387, 389 (S.D. Ohio 2008), the court certified plaintiffs' class in their suit
seeking injunctive relief and statutory damages against a law firm alleging inadequate
investigation of whether funds were exempt prior to seeking garnishment. However, the class
was not certified as to individual money damages, as the court found that would take too much
individualized inquiry, id. at 396, but did note that a finding against defendants in the suit
seeking injunctive relief would facilitate recovering damages in individual suits, id.
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modify the content of forms that control the garnishment process. 2 28 Courts in
their administrative capacities may change the forms for the good (or to the
detriment) of beneficiary debtors. 229 Because most state statutory schemes do
not define whether the debtor or bank has the burden of asserting the
exemption, such change can be effected through administrative rules. Overall,
state administrative agencies have most of the power that state legislatures
have, so long as agency action complements (and does not contradict) statutes
on the books.
3. JudicialSolutions
Federal courts, as seen above in Part IV, have the power to strike down
state statutes as violating the Due Process and Supremacy Clauses. A judge's
authority to nullify a state statute does not depend heavily on the specific facts
of the case-if the case includes a freezing of exempt funds, it provides the
rationale for finding constitutional violations. While some may pejoratively
condemn decisions nullifying state law as judicial activism, the language of
federal statutes and precedent provides a solid basis for finding constitutional
violations. Moreover, these decisions often provide the impetus needed for
state legislatures to take action. 230 A critical mass of opinions finding
constitutional violations when state laws enable account freezes could provide
the impetus for Congress to tackle the issue.
Federal judges may, in some states, remedy certain abuses by debt
collectors without challenging the underlying statutory scheme. Ohio, for
example, contains a requirement that a debt collector sign an affidavit when
pursuing garnishment that it seeks nonexempt funds. 23 1 A court imposed
liability on a debt collector who signed an affidavit without investigation,
finding this action to constitute a deceptive practice in violation of the
FDCPA.232 With the right fact pattern, a judge might also find a CCPA
228. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (describing one item on a form that
made the difference as to whether banks or debtors were required to assert the exemption).
229. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (describing the Virginia Supreme
Court Rules Committee's change to the form).
230. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting two U.S. District Court decisions
that drove legislative change to provide notice and hearings for debtors in Arkansas and
Montana).
231. See OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2716.11 (West 2006) (requiring creditors to assert a
reasonable basis for believing an account has nonexempt funds).
232. See Lee v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, 484 F. Supp. 2d 816, 820 (S.D. Ohio
2007) (identifying a case finding a FDCPA violation in a debt collector's misrepresentation on
affidavit required to obtain a garnishment order).
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violation. For example, if a creditor issues a garnishment summons pursuant to
a domestic support obligation, the CCPA limits the amount that a creditor may
garnish.233 Garnishing funds in excess of this limitation, while not
challengeable as completely violating the exemption, may be subject to
challenge for a failure to abide by the CCPA's limitations.234
State court judges have little opportunity to impact the process,
particularly given the prevalence of defaultjudgments. Individual judges could
require creditors, as a condition of garnishment authorization, to request only
nonexempt funds on the garnishment order. Most judges are unlikely,
however, to deviate from the forms promulgated by the state authority.
Furthermore, the garnishment process itself may be handled not by judges, but
by local court clerks, who would not assert this power without approval from
the state.235
B. Private Solutions
In the absence of public action, private actors (banks, beneficiaries, and
creditors) can exercise some control over exempt fund garnishment. While
many private actors will find little incentive to act, perhaps some banks and
creditors will value the goodwill of beneficiary protection enough to voluntarily
improve their processes. Particularly in the age of retiring baby boomers and
ever-escalating consumer debt, the incidence of exempt fund garnishment will
likely increase. Banks protecting their accountholders from exempt fund
garnishment may find a competitive advantage amongst consumers receiving
federal benefits.
Banks stand in the best position to take private action. They can issue
policies, as has at least one major national bank, that accounts containing solely
directly deposited exempt funds will not be garnished.236 Banks can develop
233. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (describing CCPA garnishment
limitations).
234. Although Dunlop v. FirstNationalBank ofArizona, 399 F. Supp. 855, 858 (D. Ariz.
1975) interpreted the CCPA garnishment limitation as inapplicable to funds deposited in a bank
account, one could certainly argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Porter v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 370 U.S. 159, 162 (1973)-finding that exempt funds do not lose their
exemption when deposited into a bank account-should control, rendering the CCPA
garnishment limitation applicable.
235. E-mail from Henry Woodward, Gen. Counsel, Legal Aid Society of the Roanoke
Valley, to Allen Myers (Apr. 2, 2008, 16:56 EST) (discussing the garnishment order process in
Virginia) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
236. See Beggs, Response to Proposed Guidance, supra note 14, at 5 (describing
JPMorgan Chase's policy of not freezing accounts containing solely exempt funds). Of course,
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technology systems and operating procedures to ensure that receipt of a
garnishment order triggers identification of exempt funds directly deposited
into the account. Process and system enhancements would allow the bank to
provide an authoritative answer to any creditor challenging the bank's assertion
that funds are exempt (in the unlikely event that this challenge occurs).237
Since no universally defined accounting method exists for determining what
portion of funds is exempt when nonexempt funds are commingled with
exempt funds, a bank's commitment to use one method may not be challenged
as violating existing law.238 Additionally, the time saved by implementing
orders off at the early stages
these procedures and by cutting garnishment
239
would generate long-term cost savings.
Beneficiary debtors, with knowledge, can mitigate the hardships of exempt
fund garnishment. Responsible consumer spending, like abstinence, provides
the safest solution. In a less utopian vein, beneficiaries should also understand
the importance of responding to all communications from the court as quickly
as possible. A beneficiary savvy enough to assert her exemption during the
state court judgment could conceivably avoid garnishment of an account
identified as exempt. 240 Beneficiaries should also notify their banks of the
exempt funds directly deposited into their accounts. Some banks rely on
customer notification to assert exemptions.24 ' If a bank refuses to commit to
banks could provide even greater protection by refusing to freeze any exempt funds in any
account.
237. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (noting no documented instances of banks
suffering even the "burden of legal inquiry" for refusing to hand over exempt funds).
238. See supra Part V.A. 1 (identifying the lack of a mandated accounting system); see also
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-610(3) (2007) (allowing any reasonable method of tracing funds).
239. See supra note 66-67 and accompanying text (describing the steps required to
accurately process a domestic support garnishment order). Technology to track the exempt and
nonexempt portions of funds in an account and calculate the percentage of benefits that may be
garnished would save bank employees considerable time and effort. See supra note 156 and
accompanying text (describing effort saved by early disposition of garnishment orders).
240. A leading practitioner in this area, however, discourages this course of action. "[Tlhe
notion that debtors can protect themselves by asserting the exemption at the judgment entry
stage is wholly unrealistic in Virginia," asserts the practitioner, because the issue would not be
before the court and no record would be made of the assertion; the debtor would thus travel to
court for nothing. E-mail from Henry Woodward, Gen. Counsel, Legal Aid Society of the
Roanoke Valley, to Allen Myers (Apr. 2, 2008, 16:56 EST) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
241. See, e.g., Letter from Julius L. Loeser & Carl E. Spradlin, Jr., Senior Vice Presidents,
Comerica Bank, at 1 (Nov. 7, 2007), in response to Proposed Guidance on Garnishment of
Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2007/November/20071127/OP- 1294/OP-1 29441 .pdf
("If a customer tells us that [the account contains government benefits], it is noted in the
account records and that fact is honored.").
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honoring exemptions, beneficiaries may threaten to take their business
elsewhere. If the bank does promise to honor the exemption, the most
important thing a beneficiary can do is to keep her account "pure'"242 -that is,
free of nonexempt funds.
Another action that beneficiaries can take is to voice their complaints.
Blogs such as Creditslips.org have identified the problem and sought comment
from scholars and citizens alike.243
Another channel, constituent
communication with state and national representatives, will not change the
problem overnight but may contribute to a critical mass of concern that moves
the issue from the discussion stage into the action stage.
Creditors can also reduce the incidence of exempt fund garnishment.
When deciding whether to extend credit to a consumer, creditors can apply
different standards to income from federal benefits than apply to nonexempt
income. These standards would recognize that the creditor cannot seize exempt
income to pay the debt if the beneficiary defaults. Creditors can also work to
reduce extensions of credit that will foreseeably end up as collection actions.
While this may result in reduced credit available to beneficiaries, alternative
current practices that encourage beneficiaries to overextend themselves seem
far worse.
As far as the likelihood of private action correcting exempt fund
garnishment problems, the issue does not appear remediable through marketbased efficiencies. The market has shaped this process to the detriment of
beneficiaries-the most efficient process allows creditors to garnish exempt
funds and banks to charge corresponding fees. Most banks will not change the
process voluntarily due to general risk-aversion, and also due to an
unwillingness to incur implementation costs or forfeit fees. Additionally, to the
extent that banks lend money, reducing freezes will lower their profits as
creditors. Beneficiaries often do not have the capacity to take the requisite
action to defend themselves once the garnishment process has begun, and thus
present easy opportunities for profiteering. And while bank private action can
be expected to accomplish little, creditors have even fewer economic incentives
(and more disincentives) than banks to voluntarily change their practices to
help beneficiary debtors.
Banks have not suffered appreciable negative consequences from the
current standard practice of freezing exempt funds. Banks identify state law
242. Woodward, supra note 29.
243. See Nathalie Martin, Think Public Benefits Are Exempt from Execution? Think
Again., Jan. 5,2008, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/0 l/think-public-be.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2008) (discussing exempt fund garnishment) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).

UNTANGLING THE SAFETY NET
liability for releasing funds to the beneficiary, and claim significant risk. This
threat, illusory as it may be, prevents banks from asserting (or provides cover to
banks not wishing to assert) exemptions on behalf of the debtor and avoiding
account freezes.
Banks will also recoil from implementation costs. Although exemption
identification appears capable of full automation, banks will need to pay for the
system modifications to make that automation a reality. 244 Banks must also
retrain staff to operate under new procedures required to utilize the automation.
Moreover, a congressional committee has already begun to discuss the issue.245
Banks will exhibit even more hesitancy in instituting a significant voluntary
process change because they perceive that Congress may mandate a far
different process that could require different compliance measures and
corresponding costs.
Two additional motivations (that no bank would ever acknowledge) may
influence a bank's decision not to adopt voluntary measures to help
beneficiaries. First, banks would lose the garnishment and insufficient fund
fees that they currently collect pursuant to garnishment.246 Banks collect these
fees at virtually no risk-the bank knows that the account contains the money
to cover the fees, and, if the money is eventually turned over to the creditor, the
bank levies its fees before distributing the remainder of the account. Second,
many banks are also creditors. 247 Serving in this dual bank-creditor capacity
gives banks an interest in collection of funds pursuant to garnishment orders,
undermining many banks' assertions that they are merely innocent parties
244. Judging from the various banks' responses to Proposed Guidance on Garnishment of
Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28, 2007) (banks' responses
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/index.cfm?docid=OP%2D1294&
doc ver=l), banks appear to have significantly varying levels of automation in place; banks
with less sophisticated systems would incur higher proportional implementation costs.
245. See Frozen Out: A Review of Bank Treatment of Social Security Benefits, Hearing
Before the S. Fin. Comm., http://www.senate.gov/-finance/sitepages/hearing092007.htm (last
visited Oct. 14,2008) (providing testimony from seven hearing participants) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
246. See text accompanying supra note 27 (describing standard bank fees). Most banks,
however, assert that they do not profit from the labor-intensive, time-consuming process of
complying with a garnishment order. See, e.g., Beggs, Response to Proposed Guidance, supra
note 14, at 6-7 (describing the complexities involved in garnishment compliance).
247. See, e.g., Letter from Christopher T. Curtis, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Capital One
Financial Corp., at 2 (Nov. 27, 2007), in response to Proposed Guidance on Garnishment of
Exempt Federal Benefit Funds, 72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2007/November/20071129/OP-i 294/OP-1294_13_1 .pdf
(describing Capital One as "offer[ing] a broad spectrum of financial products and services"
while also noting its "$83.3 billion in deposits and $146.4 billion in managed loans
outstanding").
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caught in disputes between creditors and debtors.24 8 These additional financial
incentives, though involving collection of funds pursuant to violations of
federal law, weigh against voluntary bank action.
The proposed banking agency guidance demonstrates the futility of private
action. The guidance exhorts banks in the most general terms to take measures
that banks either already take or would never consider taking. 249 The guidance
offers no rewards for compliance, nor threatens any consequences of noncompliance. Bank responses to the OTS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
indicate0 a flat unwillingness to change, and even indignation at being asked to
25
do so.
In fairness, some banks do maintain policies that oppose freezing
accounts.2 5 Other banks recognize the hardships but say that they cannot avoid
freezes without incurring state law liability. 252 Some banks even support a
national solution.253 Several banks have taken steps to ensure beneficiaries that
their funds will not be frozen.254 If more beneficiaries raise this issue with their
248. See Crouse, Response to Proposed Guidance, supra note 142, at 3 (portraying banks
as innocent intermediaries). This does not even consider the bank's right of direct setoff when
the bank that holds the debtor's account has issued the line of credit, which is discussed
thoroughly in Prizant, supra note 13. Although the bank's setoff right is beyond the scope of
this Note, Congress should consider combining anti-setoff legislation with anti-garnishment
legislation.
249. See supranotes 214-16 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed guidance).
250. See, e.g., Letter from Steven Zeisel, Senior Counsel, Consumer Bankers Association,
at 4 (Nov. 5, 2007), in response to Proposed Rulemaking on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,570 (Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.regulations.
gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectld=0900006480360530&disposition=attachment&cont
entType=pdf ("Freezing accounts under a court order pending determination of account fund
sources is merely an example of a practical response to judicial process that protects the
institution from liability. It has no business on this list [of targeted practices]."); Letter from
Richard Whiting, Exec. Dir., Financial Services Roundtable, at 8 (Nov. 5, 2007), in response to
Proposed Rulemaking on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,570 (Aug. 6,
2007), availableat http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectld=090000
64803604ad&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (stating that "complying with a
garnishment order should not be considered an unfair or deceptive act or practice," thereby
implying that freezes are necessary for compliance).
251. Some banks already follow this policy. See Beggs, Response to Proposed Guidance,
supra note 14, at 5 (identifying JPMorgan Chase's policy of refusing to freeze an account
containing wholly exempt funds).
252. See, e.g., Koch, Response to Proposed Guidance, supra note 14, at 2 ("A bank
assumes financial risk if it releases funds before [a state] court determines how much of the
account balance is subject to federal exemption.").
253. Indeed, even the American Bankers Association has proposed a national solution
along the lines of the statutory schemes in California and Connecticut. See SSA REPORT, supra
note 4, app. F at F-4 to F-6.
254. See Saunders, Frozen Out, supra note 4, at 15 n.33 (providing a list of banks that
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banks, more banks might see the value of implementing processes that prevent
freezing of exempt funds. Overall, however, most banks will likely continue to
view an account freeze as a standard, practical approach to avoiding liability.255
Private actions by beneficiary debtors and creditors will do very little to
address the problem. Responsible consumer spending is easy to advocate but
impossible to effect. Particularly given the typically low income of
beneficiaries, can one blame a person for using a credit card if it provides the
only means to buy both food and medicine? Creditor voluntary action looks
equally unlikely. So long as the pursuit of exempt funds presents a low risk of
adverse action with a chance of debt collection, creditors will continue to seek
garnishment orders against bank accounts without regard to whether they
contain exempt funds.
VI. Conclusion
This Note concludes with some recommendations for overcoming the
political challenges facing the legislation proposed in Part V. The public
interest benefits of this legislation are clear; the advantages of protecting the
vulnerable beneficiary population do not require detailed explication.2 56
Making this legislation palatable to banks and creditors, however, may present
a challenge, requiring clear explanation of the benefits to all parties. Banks and
creditors should understand that a well-crafted law will provide them with longterm cost savings.
Benefiting both banks and creditors, this legislation would eliminate the
existing patchwork of state laws. This standardization would allow banks and
creditors to streamline and centralize garnishment management processes.
Such legislation would also reduce costs ofhandling invalid garnishment orders
for banks and creditors, as they could dismiss these orders quickly without
going through the whole cumbersome process.257 Creditors assert that

promise not to freeze exempt funds). Such promises, however, are not always clear-cut. See
Taliaferro, Frozen Out, supra note 1, at 2-3 (describing how commingling of $25 in accountopening bonus funds with his benefit funds nullified the bank's promise not to freeze his
account).
255. See supra note 250 and accompanying text (identifying common bank attitude
towards garnishing exempt funds).
256. See, e.g., Baucus, Frozen Out, supra note 216, at 1 (invoking scripture to describe the
injustice of account freezes).
257. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text (describing reduced labor costs for
banks and creditors in balancing due process interests).
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uncollected debt hurts all consumers.258 Conversely, efficiencies in creditor
operations will drive down costs, helping all consumers.
Benefiting banks, this legislation eliminates the threat of liability for
wrongly distributing exempt funds to the accountholder. The legislation could
also distribute some garnishment costs to creditors, as do some states. 259 This
concession to banks, however, comes at the clear cost of increased creditor
opposition.
Banks and creditors may contend that this Note's proposed legislation will
lead beneficiaries to spend recklessly and abuse credit. 260 The exempt fund
garnishment scenario, however, does not appear ripe for abuse. Few would
consciously trade a modest extension of credit (most beneficiaries are not
eligible for large credit extensions) for years of creditor harassment. Most of
the beneficiaries in reported instances of exempt fund garnishment are
unsophisticated consumers who let their debt get the better of them and have
minimal if any awareness of the garnishment process and their exemptions.
Moreover, these beneficiaries are far less likely than the average citizen to be
able to afford counsel to protect their rights.26'
Overall, this Note has attempted to shed light upon a discrete but serious
problem. While benefits freezes may affect a small number of people in
258. See Letter from Rozanne M. Andersen, Gen. Counsel, ACA International, at 5 (Nov.
27,2007), in response to Proposed Guidance on Garnishment of Exempt Federal Benefit Funds,
72 Fed. Reg. 55,273 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/SECRS/2007/November/20071129/OP-1294/OP-1294_17 l.pdf (citing a 2006 study
asserting that debt collection saves each household $351 per year).
259. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 525.240 (West 2002) (granting a garnishee the full costs
of handling any garnishment that does not result in recovery of the funds sought in the
garnishment order).
260. While such a contention makes logical sense, it assumes patterns of debtor behavior
that may not hold. In the bankruptcy context, Professors Susan Block-Lieb and Edward J.
Janger examined a comparable contention-that debtors used the Bankruptcy Code's discharge
provisions to recklessly run up debt with no intention of ever paying it off-in light ofempirical
data indicating that debtors, when faced with easy access to credit on disadvantageous terms, did
not behave "rationally." See generallySusan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the
Rational Debtor, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1481 (2005). Demographic study of bankruptcy filers
indicates that increased borrowing occurs when "[d]ebtors are pushed over the financial edge by
personal tragedy-events such as divorce, job loss, and uninsured medical expenses." Id. at
1485 (citing TERESA A. SuLLrvAN, ELizABErH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS INDEBT 15-21 (2000)). Although these scholars discuss
bankruptcy filers, the scholars' logic applies equally to the debtors discussed in this Note.
261. See, e.g., Granger v. Harris, No. CV-05-3607 (SJF)(ARL), 2007 WL 1213416, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007) (noting that plaintiffs argued pro se); Taliaferro, Frozen Out, supra
note 1, at 3 (gaining legal assistance from Brooklyn Legal Services). This demonstrates another
potential positive impact of benefits protection legislation-freeing up legal aid resources to do
other important work.
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proportion to the general population, the effects are often devastating. With
massive baby boomer retirements just beginning, and with consumer debt
steadily increasing, one can expect the incidence of exempt fund garnishment
to keep rising until government takes action to prevent it. One can only hope
that Congress will not sit idly by while its proffered protection to beneficiaries
lies impotent, caught in the tangled tendrils of conflicting state and federal law.
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Appendix
This appendix surveys current garnishment law in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia. Compare this survey with a similar appendix developed
in 1980 by Judge Aldisert for his dissenting opinion in Finbergv. Sullivan, 634
F.2d 50, 86-93 (3d Cir. 1980). The three tables below address each of the
three classes of states as specified supra Part III.B. 1. The tables below also
identify, with asterisks, states that have amended garnishment laws since 1980
to improve debtor protection. This appendix provides only a brief overview of
each state's notice and exemption provisions; for more detail, review each
state's individual code.
*Indicates state adding debtor protection since 1980
State
CA*

CT*

NY*

First-Class States
Law
California exempts a certain amount-ranging from $1,225 to
$3,650, depending upon the number of depositors and type of
benefits-from garnishment without the debtor having to assert a
claim, preventing a bank from freezing the beneficiary's account in its
entirety. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.080(b) (West Supp. 2008).
Under CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-367b (West 2005 & Supp.
2008), a bank must leave the lesser of the account balance or $1,000 in
an account containing readily identifiable benefits directly deposited
within thirty days. Banks asserting exemptions on behalf of debtors
are immune from "bona fide error[s]." Id. § 52-367b(o). If the debtor
has more than $1,000 exempt funds in an account and wishes to assert
the additional amount as exempt, she may notify the garnishee and
creditor of this exemption claim. Id. § 52-367b(e). The creditor may
then request a hearing to contest the exemption. Id. § 52-367b(f).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2009) lists
exemptions. New York refers to a garnishment order as a "restraining
notice." Id. 5222. Subsection (e) requires notice to the debtor in a
form including a list of exemptions. The notice directs the debtor to
rules 5239-40, which define the exemption claim procedure-this
procedure may lead to a protective order shielding the exempt funds;
notice instructs the debtor to "act promptly." Id. 5222(e). In 2008,
New York enacted legislation preventing up to $2,500 in a bank
account containing reasonably identifiable exempt funds deposited
within forty-five days. Id. 5205(l). This law became effective on
January 1, 2009. Id.
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PA*

State
AL*

AK

AZ*

PA. R.C.P. No. 3108 (West 2002) provides for notice to the
debtor in garnishment action, although no exemption list is specified.
Most importantly, all funds in a bank account are exempt if the
account contains electronically deposited exempt benefits. Id. No.
3111.1 (West Supp. 2008). Banks are also shielded from liability
when asserting exemptions on behalf of debtors. Id. No. 3146(b)(2)
(West Supp. 2008). 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8124 (West 2007) lists
exempt property.
Second-Class States
Law
ALA. CODE § 6-10-37 (LexisNexis 2005) governs garnishment
proceedings; the statute does not provide for notice to the debtor. ALA.
R. CIV. P. 64A (LexisNexis 2007-2008), however, does require notice,
including a list of exemptions and instructions on how to claim them.
If a creditor fails to contest the exemption within fifteen days, the
exemption is allowed. Id. 64B. If the creditor does contest the
exemption, the state must schedule a hearing within seven days. Id
Also, notice of garnishment must be served "contemporaneously" on
the debtor and garnishee. Id.
Under ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.080(b) (2006), the creditor must
sign an affidavit asserting that it has "reason to believe" the debtor has
non-exempt property. Any interested party may pursue a hearing "as
soon as practicable." Id. § 09.38.080(e). The individual claiming the
exemption must carry the burden of proving that the property is
exempt. Id. § 09.38.080(0. To inform debtors of exemptions, the state
statutory scheme requires a summary statement in lay terminology of
exemptions to be included with the notice of garnishment. Id.
§ 09.38.085(a). A $1,400 liquid asset exemption may also cover bank
accounts. Id. § 09.38.030(b).
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1572-2 (2003) requires a creditor to
assert "good reason to believe" that a garnishee has nonexempt debtor
property. The creditor must notify the judgment debtor of the
garnishment. Id. § 12-1574. Notice must include an explanation of the
debtor's exemption rights and a form with which to request a hearing.
Id. § 12-1596. The debtor must request the hearing within ten days of
notice, and the court must schedule the hearing within five days of the
request unless the matter is continued for "good cause." Id. § 12-1580.

AR*

ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-110-402 (2006) controls garnishment
procedure, requiring notice to defendant of the garnishment, specific

426

CO

FL*

GA
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exemptions (including federal benefits) and the right to a hearing. If
the debtor asserts exemptions, the court must hold a hearing within five
days. Id. § 16-66-211 (2005).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54.5-106 (2008) requires notice to the debtor
of garnishment. The statutory scheme also requires notice of property
exemptions, id. § 13-54-102, and earnings exemptions, id. § 13-54-104,
which appear to cover federal benefits. The notice must also include the
method of claiming exemptions and right to a hearing. Id. §§ 13-54.5106(k) to -106(). If the debtor requests a hearing, it must be held within
ten days. Id. § 13-54.5-109(1)(a). A garnishee is not required to assert
exemptions on behalf of the debtor. Id. § 13-54.5-108.5.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 77.041 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) requires
notice to defendant of garnishment, exemptions, and a hearing "as soon
as possible." If plaintiff does not contest the exemption within eight
days, the garnishment writ is dissolved. Id. The bank must answer a
garnishment order within twenty days. Id. § 77.04.
GA. CODE ANN. § 18-4-62 (2004) defines the notice that the
creditor must give the garnishee. The creditor must serve notice of
garnishment filing upon the debtor. Id. § 18-4-64. The garnishment
summons requires the garnishee to hold all property "except what is
exempt." Id. § 18-4-66. The debtor may become a party to the
garnishment proceedings by filing a "traverse," which triggers a hearing
within ten days, although the statute does not mention exemptions. Id.
§ 18-4-93.

HI*

ID

HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 653-1 to -17 (1993) covers garnishment of
government beneficiaries, but these statutes appear to contemplate
direct garnishment of the distributing agency, not garnishment of bank
accounts. The statutory scheme for garnishment, id. §§ 652-1 to -15,
does not provide notice to the postjudgment debtor. HAW. DIST. CT. R.
CIV. P. 70 (2007), however, requires a creditor to file an affidavit or
declaration stating that the funds the creditor seeks to garnish are not
traceable to public assistance funds, nor to funds that are "not nongarnishable under the law." This rule does not state what a debtor must
do to assert an exemption.
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 8-507 to -507D (2004) requires notice of
garnishment and exemptions, and a form for claiming exemptions.
Statutes prescribe the form content, including notification of federal
benefits exemptions and instructions to assert exemptions within fourteen
days of notice. Id. § 8-507C. The judgment creditor has five days to
contest an exemption, or the funds are released to the debtor. Id.
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IN*
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KY

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-701 (West 2003) requires the
creditor to file a garnishment affidavit affirming that the creditor has
served a garnishment summons on the garnishee and provided a copy to
the debtor. This summons lists exemptions and the judgment debtor's
right to a hearing. Id. § 5/12-705 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). The
garnishee must hold any "non-exempt" property. Id. § 5/12-707. No
creditor may collect on a garnishment order unless the debtor receives
notice of both the garnishment order and the garnishee's answer. Id.
§ 5/12-711.
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-25-3-2 (LexisNexis 1998) provides
procedures for garnishment, which do not specify notice to debtor of
garnishment or right to exemptions or hearing. When garnishing a
financial institution, however, the creditor must serve the bank (which
then serves the debtor) with notice of the debtor's right to exemptions
and a hearing request form. Id. § 28-9-3-4 (LexisNexis 2000).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 642.14 (West 1995) prevents entry of
judgment against the garnishee until the debtor has ten days' notice.
The debtor may plead the exemption in the garnishment proceedings.
Id. § 642.15. The statute does not clarify how the debtor receives
notice of hearing and exemption rights.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-735 (2005) provides comprehensive
notice, immediately after the creditor serves the garnishee, of the
debtor's right to assert exemptions and request a hearing within ten
days. If a hearing is requested, it must be held five to ten days after
request, id § 60-735(b), and the debtor has the burden to prove
property is exempt, id. § 60-735(c). For garnishment orders served on
financial institutions, the institution is instructed to withhold 110% of
the judgment creditor's claim. Id. § 60-733. Rendition of a
garnishment judgment against exempt moneys or property is
prohibited. Id. § 60-724(3).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425.501 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008)
requires notice to the debtor of garnishment (though not of the right to
exemptions or hearing), and allows the debtor to appear to assert
exemptions. It also directs the creditor to pay the garnishee a $10
processing fee. Id. The statutory scheme defines exemptions, but not
the procedure for asserting them. Id. §§ 427.005-.990. KY. R. CIV. P.
69.02 (West 2008) describes garnishment procedure with reference to
general rules regarding service and answer.

LA*

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881 (2006 & Supp. 2008) defines
exemptions, but not the procedure for asserting them. LA. CODE CIV.
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ME*

MD

MI

MN

MO

PROC. ANN. art. 2411 (2002 & Supp. 2008) addresses garnishment of
financial institutions. The debtor must receive notice of garnishment
(but not of exemption or hearing rights) by "mail or electronic means,"
and the garnishee must answer within fifteen days. Id. art. 2412.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3127-A (2003) describes the
notice and hearing process: The bank holds funds for twenty days,
during which time the debtor may assert an exemption and request a
hearing. The statute does not indicate how the debtor is notified of her
right to exemptions and hearing.
MD. RULE 2-645 (LexisNexis 2008) governs property
garnishment, requiring creditors to notify judgment debtors of
exemptions and of the right to contest the garnishment. The garnishee
may assert "any defense that the judgment debtor could assert," which
presumably allows banks to assert exemptions on behalf ofdebtors. Id.
2-645(e). The garnishee must answer within thirty days. Id. 2-645(g).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4011 (West 2000) provides for
garnishment but does not require the creditor to notify the debtor.
Michigan Court Rules dictate that the garnishee must notify the debtor
within seven days of receiving the garnishment order.
MCR
3.101(F)(2) (2007). The debtor then has fourteen days to file an
objection. Id. 3.101(K). A hearing must be held within twenty-one
days of the date objections are filed. Id. Notice to the debtor of
exemptions and hearing rights is not required by statute, although a
state form provides this notice. See Draft, Request and Writ for
Garnishment Form, available at http://courts.michigan.gov/scao/
courtforms/publicationdrafts/mc 13.pdf.
The debtor must receive notice of garnishment and exemptions
within five days of service on the garnishee. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 571.72(4) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). Any party may move for the
court to determine the validity of an asserted exemption. Id. Failure to
provide exemption notice renders the garnishment void. Id. § 571.911.
The debtor may obtain the money seven days after filing an exemption
notice unless the creditor objects. Id. § 571.913. If the creditor does
object, a hearing must be held within five days of the objection. Id.
§ 571.914(1). A garnishee is exempt from wrongful retention liability
if it believes in good faith that the funds are subject to the garnishment
summons. Id. § 571.73.
It appears that the debtor receives a copy of the garnishment
notice, but not a list of exemptions. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 521.170,
525.020 (West 2002). The statutory scheme provides a process for a
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MT*

NE

NV*

NH*

NJ

creditor to contest the garnishee's answer, but no similar process for the
debtor to contest the garnishment or exemptions. Id. § 525.190.
Attachment of property exempted by statute is prohibited; this may
extend to garnishment. Id. § 521.240. An executing officer must
notify a judgment debtor of her exemption rights. Id. § 513.445.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-211 (2007) requires notice to the
debtor of the seizure, right to exemptions and procedure for contesting
the garnishment. Federal benefits exemptions are listed in section 2513-608. The debtor must file an exemption claim within ten days of
receiving the execution order, and is entitled to a hearing within ten
days of filing. Id. § 25-13-212.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1056 (1995 & Supp. 2006) requires that
the garnishee answer a garnishment summons within ten days. The
court must provide debtors with a notice of exemptions form upon
issuance of a writ of execution, id. § 25-1516; this presumably applies
to garnishments as well. The notice includes a hearing request form;
the debtor must act within twenty days. Id.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.076 (2007) requires the sheriff to notify the
judgment debtor. Notice includes an exemption form, which specifies
federal benefits as exempt and describes the procedure for claiming the
exemption. Id. § 21.075. If the creditor does not object within five
days, the funds are released to the debtor; if the creditor does object, a
hearing must occur within ten days. Id.
Garnishment is called "trustee process" in New Hampshire. N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 512:9-b (1997 & Supp. 2007) governs trustee
process on bank accounts. The writ must be served on both the trustee
and the debtor, although notice of exemptions and right to a hearing are
not required. Id. § 5 12:3. Exemptions are listed at id. § 5 12:21. The
court may equitably stay proceedings if the trustee is found to have
money not payable, id. § 512:37; this could be construed to cover
exempt funds.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 17-63 (West 2000) requires that the debtor
receive a copy of the garnishment order, but does not mention the
debtor's right to exemptions or a hearing. Case law demonstrates that
the debtor may assert an exemption, Halliburton Co. v. Mor, 555 A.2d
55, 55-56 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988), which may occur during
the exemption inventory prescribed by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 17-20, although it is unclear whether this exemption inventory
applies to garnishment.
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N.M. STAT. § 35-12-2 (1996) provides for service of the
garnishment summons, which the garnishee must answer within twenty
days. The statutory scheme prescribes the form of this summons. Id.
§ 35-12-18. Exemptions are defined to include only wage and salary
exemptions. Id. § 35-12-7. The garnishee has a conclusive defense
against the debtor if it pays the creditor per the terms of the
garnishment order. Id. § 35-12-12. The debtor may contest the
garnishee's answer. Id. § 35-12-5. The requirement for notice to the
debtor is found in N.M. RULES ANN. § 2-802 (2008): The garnishee
must serve this notice to the debtor within four days of receiving the
garnishment order, and notice (for non-wage garnishments) must
include a form for claiming exemptions.
The statutory scheme does not identify garnishment per se as a
remedy, although N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-360 (2007) allows creditors to
proceed against "[d]ebtors ofjudgment debtor." State exemptions are
listed id. § IC-1601. The creditor must provide notice to judgment
debtors, with an extremely long, complex listing of exemptions. Id.
§ IC-1603. The debtor has twenty days to file an exemption claim or
request a hearing. Id. The North Carolina Constitution provides
additional exemptions, including $500 of personal property. N.C.
CONST. art X, § 1. This exemption could conceivably apply to a bank
account.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-09.1-07 (Supp. 2007) prescribes
garnishment notice to the debtor, including a form; the notice does not
describe exemption or hearing rights. The garnishee may assert
exemptions on behalf of the defendant. Id. § 32-09.1-09. If the debtor
claims exemptions, she must fill out a personal property schedule
within twenty days of notice. Id. § 32-09.1-22. The debtor's
exemption claim will be heard any time, provided the creditor receives
three days' notice. Id. 32-09.1-23.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2716.01-.21 (West 2006) govern
garnishment. The creditor must fill out an affidavit stating a
"reasonable basis to believe" that the garnishee has nonexempt debtor
property. Id. § 2716.11. The debtor must receive notice with a list of
exemptions and an explanation of how to request a hearing; the debtor
must assert exemptions within five days of receiving notice. Id.
§ 2716.13.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1173.3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008)
sets forth general garnishment procedures. The garnishee may assert an
exemption on behalf of the debtor. Id. § 11 73.3(E)(3). The summons
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VT

serves as a lien "to the extent the property is not exempt from
garnishment." Id.§ 1173.3(F). The debtor must receive notice that
identifies exemptions and instructs the debtor to claim any exemptions
within five days. Id.§ 1174. The statutory scheme specifically allows
for a mutual garnishee-defendant exemption defense. Id.§ 1181.
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.658 (2007) requires creditors to deliver the
exemption notice form and a challenge form as prescribed by sections
18.845 and 18.850. The notice warns the debtor to act promptly
(within ten days). Id.§ 18.845. Sections 18.345-.428 define exempt
property.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-18-1 to -53 (2004) govern
garnishment. The creditor must affirm in an affidavit that the property
sought is, "to the best of the knowledge and belief' of the creditor, not
exempt. Id.§ 21-18-3. The debtor must receive a copy of the
garnishment summons; any garnishment not providing this notice is
void. Id.§ 21-18-10. A debtor must also receive notice of any levy;
this notice must inform the debtor of her right to exemptions. Id.§ 2119-3.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-403 (2000 & Supp. 2008) prohibits
garnishment without notice. Notice is specified id.
§ 26-2-404, which
alerts the debtor to possible exemptions and the process for asserting
them. If the debtor acts within twenty days, the court will hear the
debtor's claim within fourteen days of receiving it. Id.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 657-679 (1967 & Supp. 2008) control the
garnishment process. Rule 663a requires notice to the debtor informing
her of the right to file a motion to dissolve the writ, although not
notifying her of exemptions. Rule 664b outlines the dissolution motion
procedure. The debtor may raise exemptions as grounds for
dissolution. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. ICO, Inc., 230 S.W.3d
702, 706-07 (Tex. App. 2007).
UTAH R. CIV. P. 64D (2008) defines garnishment procedure. The
garnishee must "serve the writ, its answers, notice of exemptions
and.., the reply form on the debtor." Id. 64D(g)(3). Either the
creditor or the debtor may request a hearing. Id.64D(h). Form 41
provides notice of exemptions and request for hearing; the debtor has
ten days to request a hearing. Id.F4 1.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3168 (2002) allows for trustee process,
made applicable to bank account funds by section 2732. VT. R.C.P.
4.20)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2008) requires that the debtor receive notice of
process and a list of exemptions. Rule 4.2(k) provides for the same
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VA*

WA

WI

WY*

notice in "postjudgment process." Form 34 lists exemptions, and
encourages the debtor to contact an attorney for help in claiming them.
Id. F34.
Virginia provides notice to the debtor of the garnishment,
exemptions and hearing rights. See supra notes 112-32 and
accompanvin2 text for a detailed descriotion.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 6.27.130 (West 1995 & Supp. 2008)
requires that the debtor receive garnishment notice on the same day as
or before notice to the garnishee. Section 6.27.140 sets forth the notice
of exemptions form and instructions for claiming the exemptions. Id.
§ 6.27.140. The debtor has twenty-eight days to file, after which the
creditor has ten days to object; if the creditor objects, a hearing must be
held within fourteen days. Id.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 812.07 (West 2007) requires service on both
the garnishee and the debtor. The garnishee may assert the debtor's
exemptions, id. § 812.11(4), and the debtor can join in the trial, id.
§ 812.15. Wisconsin provides a long list of exemptions, including
$1,000 in a bank account. Id. § 815.18. Failure to claim an exemption
constitutes a waiver thereof. Id. § 815.18(6)(a). The scheme does not
appear to inform the debtor that these exemptions exist.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-402 (2007) allows garnishment only of
property not exempt by state or federal law. The debtor must receive a
copy of the garnishment summons within five days of its service on
garnishee. Id. § 1-15-409. Either the creditor or the debtor may contest
the garnishee's answer. Id. § 1-15-412. The statutory scheme does not
explain how the debtor learns of exemptions or the right to assert them
at trial.

State
DE

Third-Class States
Law
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3512 (1999) gives the Delaware
Superior Court authority to make rules respecting attachments. Rules
issued pursuant to this authority include DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R.
4(c)(2) (2008) (giving a garnishee twenty days to answer in the form
provided in Form 45). The state statutory scheme makes no mention
of notice to the debtor of the garnishment, exemption or right to a
hearing.

DC

D.C. CODE ANN. § 15-501(a)(7) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp.
2008) exempts "the debtor's rightto receive" benefits from attachment
for heads of household (emphasis added). The debtor is also promised
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a trial to assert exemptions. Id. § 15-521. The code does not,
however, define how the debtor receives notice of the garnishment,
exemptions and trial rights. The garnishee must hold assets pending
Sjudicial determination of the propriety of the
attachment. Id. § 16-547.
MA

MS

RI

SC

The state refers to garnishment as "trustee process," but the
governing statutes refer to prejudgment remedies; postjudgment
trustee process is not mentioned. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 246,
§§ 1-67 (2004). Exemptions are listed with no explanation of how to
assert them. Id. ch. 235, § 34 (2000). The trustee must answer within
twenty days, id. ch. 246, § 10, and is liable after thirty days, id. § 41.
Although a federal court found prejudgment trustee process without
notice and a hearing to be unconstitutional, Schneider v. Margossian,
349 F. Supp. 741, 745 (D. Mass 1972), the statutory scheme does not
require notice to the postjudgment debtor.
Although MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-35-33 (West 1999) allows the
garnishee to claim exemptions on behalf of the debtor, it does not
provide for notice to the debtor if the garnishee does not claim
exemptions. The code provides for service on the garnishee, but not
the debtor. Id. § 11-35-9. The debtor can contest the garnishee's
answer if the defendant manages to obtain notice of the garnishment.
Id. § 11-35-47. If the garnishee fails to claim exemptions and turns
the funds over to the creditor, the debtor's remedy is against the
garnishee, not the creditor. See Folse v. Stennett-Yancey, 757 So. 2d
989, 992 (Miss. 2000).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-25-12 (1997) defines the form used for
trustee process, and does not include notice to the debtor. A garnishee
may assert mistake in response to a garnishment order, id. § 9-25-24,
which could shield a bank's good faith erroneous belief of exemption.
Bank accounts may also be attached pursuant to a judgment. See
Dionne v. Bouley, 757 F.2d 1344, 1346 (1st Cir. 1985). One code
section, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-5-2, does require notice, although it
appears to address provisional attachment, not post-judgment
attachment.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-350 (2005) provides for garnishment,
referring to it as "examination of debtors of [a] judgment debtor." The
code provides for application of non-exempt property towards a debt,
id. § 15-39-410; presumably, any order to apply exempt property is
invalid under this statute. Exempt property is listed id. § 15-41-30.
The statutory scheme neither provides notice to the debtor nor defines
the procedure for asserting exemptions.
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W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-7-15 (LexisNexis 2005) provides for
garnishment. The code section that defines the garnishee's answer
does not mention exemptions. Id. § 38-7-24. The list of personal
property exemptions includes $1,000 on deposit, id. § 38-8-1; this
could conceivably serve as the basis for a self-executing exemption.
Although id. § 38-7-30 may require notice to the debtor, this statute
does not specify whether it applies to garnishment notice. Certain
retirement accounts are listed as exempt, but the code lists no other
exemptions. Id. § 38-7-7. The civil procedure rule that addresses
garnishment does not require notice to the debtor. W. VA. R. CIV. P.
64 (LexisNexis 2008).

